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Abstract
To address the overload conditions caused by the increasing network traffic vol-
ume, recent literature in the network intrusion detection and prevention field has
proposed the use of clusters of network intrusion detection and prevention systems
(NIDPSs). We observe that simple traffic distribution schemes are usually used for
NIDPS clusters. These schemes have two major drawbacks: (1) the loss of correla-
tion information caused by the traffic distribution because correlated flows are not
sent to the same NIDPS and (2) the unbalanced loads of the NIDPSs. The first
drawback severely affects the ability to detect intrusions that require analysis of
correlated flows. The second drawback greatly increases the chance of overloading
an NIDPS even when loads of the others are low.
In this thesis, we address these two drawbacks. In particular, we propose two
novel traffic distribution systems: the Correlation-Based Load Balancer and the
Correlation-Based Load Manager as two different solutions to the NIDPS traffic
distribution problem. On the one hand, the Load Balancer and the Load Manager
both consider the current loads of the NIDPSs while distributing traffic to pro-
vide fine-grained load balancing and dynamic load distribution, respectively. On
the other hand, both systems take into account traffic correlation in their distribu-
tions, thereby significantly reducing the loss of correlation information during their
distribution of traffic.
We have implemented prototypes of both systems and evaluated them using
extensive simulations and real traffic traces. Overall, the evaluation results show
that both systems have low overhead in terms of the delays introduced to the pack-
ets. More importantly, compared to the naive hash-based distribution, the Load
Balancer significantly improves the anomaly-based detection accuracy of DDoS at-
tacks and port scans – the two major attacks that require the analysis of correlated
flows – meanwhile, the Load Manager successfully maintains the anomaly-based
detection accuracy of these two major attacks of the NIDPSs.
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1.1 Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Systems
Nowadays, as people rely heavily on computer systems to conduct business and op-
erate mission critical devices, effects of viruses and worms can easily be disastrous.
One way to combat the spread of viruses and worms is to use intrusion detection
systems.
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) detect unauthorized use of and malicious
activities on computer systems and networks. There are two major types of IDS:
host-based IDS (HIDS) and network-based IDS (NIDS) [9]. While host-based IDSs
detect intrusions by monitoring file system modifications, application execution
logs, system calls, and so on, network-based IDSs detect intrusions by examining
packets that travel on network links.
Compared to network-based IDSs, host-based IDSs have access to more refined
resources, such as file system and system calls. On the other hand, network-based
IDSs are able to detect intrusions at an earlier stage and they have global views of
the networks. As a result, these two systems can complement each other to provide
high quality detection.
Intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) extend the capabilities of IDSs by providing
real-time protection to the resources. For instance, a network-based IPS is capable
of dropping malicious packets while still allowing legitimate traffic to pass through
and a host-based IPS can block suspicious accesses to certain files in real-time.
In this research, we are interested in network-based intrusion detection and
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Figure 1.1: Placement of an NIDPS
prevention systems (NIDPSs) which can detect intrusions and prevent them when
necessary. NIDPSs are usually placed at the edges of networks – between the
internal and the external networks. NIDPSs monitor all packets coming in from
the external networks and going out of the internal networks to detect and prevent
intrusions. Figure 1.1 shows the placement of an NIDPS in a network. Some of the
popular operational NIDPSs are Snort [34], Bro [31], and Cisco IPSs [7].
Based on the approach used for detection, NIDPSs are categorized into two
classes: misuse and anomaly-based [9]. Misuse NIDPSs detect intrusions by match-
ing the monitored traffic with previously known intrusive traffic patterns or attack
signatures. As a result, misuse NIDPSs are also called signature-based NIDPSs. On
the other hand, anomaly-based NIDPSs detect intrusions by detecting deviations
of the monitored traffic from the normal traffic patterns or the baselines. These
baselines are predefined by the administrators and can include traffic load, typical
packet sizes, protocol distribution, and so on.
1.2 Clusters of NIDPSs
Since network traffic volume is increasing with an exponential rate [35], and NIDPSs
are becoming more complex, a critical problem with using a single NIDPS in a
network is that it could be easily overloaded. When overloaded, the NIDPS becomes
a bottleneck of the network. The consequence is that packets going in and out of
the network suffer long delays; eventually, the NIDPS has to drop some packets.
Dropping packets compromises the security offered by the NIDPS because some
intrusions cannot be detected if some of the packets involved are dropped. For
example, flow-based analyses, which are used by most of the NIDPSs, require that
all packets belonging to a flow be examined by a single NIDPS.
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In order to handle the increasingly high network traffic volume, there are two
possible solutions:
1. Upgrading hardware and tuning software of the NIDPSs so that they can
handle more traffic.
2. Using clusters of NIDPSs and distributing the traffic across the NIDPSs.
The first solution is costly and not scalable. Since network bandwidth is con-
tinuously increasing by a factor of 10 every 4 years [35], continuous upgrades are
required for the NIDPSs to operate. This results in high adoption and maintenance
costs. Moreover, tuning NIDPSs is a challenging task with many trade-offs [10].
The tuning also makes the NIDPSs overly complicated and the management tasks
very difficult.
The second solution, using clusters of NIDPSs, is affordable and scalable. In
fact, it has been adopted by many researchers [2, 18, 35, 40, 43]. This solution takes
advantage of the availability of low cost computers. It uses several of them together
to handle the high traffic load. Moreover, extending the system can be done by
adding additional NIDPSs to the cluster. When using clusters of NIDPSs, however,
the distribution of the network traffic to the NIDPSs plays a very important role;
this is the main focus of our research.
1.3 Motivation
We observe that simple traffic distribution schemes are usually used for NIDPS
clusters. These schemes apply simple hash functions on subset of the 5-tuples:
source IP address (src-ip), source port number (src-port), destination IP address
(dst-ip), destination port number (dst-port), and protocol (proto) from each of the
incoming packets to distribute the packets to the NIDPSs [39, 43].
There are two major problems with these simple distribution schemes:
1. Correlated flows are not sent to the same NIDPS.
2. The loads of the NIDPSs are not balanced.
The first problem is very critical. Since the correlated flows are distributed
across many NIDPSs, some correlation information – the information derived from
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the correlated flows – is lost. This loss of correlation information severely affects the
anomaly-based detection and prevention of some intrusions which require analysis
of the correlated flows. In the worst case, these intrusions might slip through the
NIDPSs undetected. Well-known representatives of these intrusions are distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks and port scans.
To demonstrate, we conducted a simple simulation. We simulated a port scan
which involved an attacker scanning ports 1–1000 of a victim. We used Snort [34]
as our port scan detector. In this simulation, there were two settings: a single
NIDPS and a cluster of 10 NIDPSs with a hash-based traffic distribution scheme.
The implemented hash function was a simple additive hash: (src-ip + src-port +
dst-ip + dst-port) mod n, where n is the number of NIDPSs. The background
traffic was omitted for simplicity.
When a single NIDPS was used to handle all the traffic, it detected the port
scan; however, when the cluster was used, the port scan was not detected. This was
because the flows of the port scan were distributed fairly evenly to all the NIDPSs,
rather than to a single NIDPS.
The second problem is not less critical. The objective of using clusters of
NIDPSs is to avoid overload conditions. However, if the loads of the NIDPSs
are not balanced, then one of the NIDPSs might become overloaded even when
loads of the other NIDPSs are low. Again, overloaded NIDPSs drop packets, which
compromises security. Hence, poor load balancing results in an ineffective use of
NIDPS clusters and also weakens the security of the clusters.
This research addresses the above two critical problems. We argue that by
intelligently analyzing the traffic correlation and actively monitoring the loads of
the NIDPSs, we can distribute the traffic to the NIDPSs in better ways – ways
that reduce the loss of correlation information and provide load balancing to avoid
overload conditions.
Finally, we note that the correlation information considered in our study is of
which can be extracted from the five-tuples: src-ip, dst-ip, src-port, dst-port, and
proto. Because extracting and analyzing packets’ payload are expensive in terms of
processing time, they are not supported by our study, which wishes to distribute the
traffic in real-time. As a result, correlation information derived from the packets’
payload is out of the scope of this research.
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1.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are the two novel solutions that we developed
to intelligently distribute network traffic to the NIDPSs in real-time. The two
implemented systems corresponding to the solutions are the “Correlation-Based
Load Balancer” and the “Correlation-Based Load Manager” (“Load Balancer” and
“Load Manager” for short).
In particular, the proposed Load Balancer delivers the following features:
1. Fine-grained Load Balancing: The Load Balancer distributes the traffic in a
way such that the difference between NIDPSs’ loads is kept within a specified
bound. This provides both protection and better traffic engineering to the
network.
2. Anomaly-Based Detection and Prevention Support: Our Load Balancer is ca-
pable of grouping correlated flows in real-time. In particular, we focus on
grouping flows which have identical dst-ip, src-ip, or dst-port, which greatly
increases the accuracy of anomaly-based detection of DDoS attacks and port
scans. Additionally, our Load Balancer preserves flows. Thus, it fully sup-
ports flow-based analysis.
3. Configurable Security: With our Load Balancer, one might favor security, i.e.,
reduced loss of correlation information, over performance, i.e., load balancing,
when it is desirable to do so.
Meanwhile, the proposed Load Manager offers the following features:
1. Identical Correlation Preservation: Flows having the same dst-ip, src-ip, or
dst-port are guaranteed to be sent to the same NIDPS. This maintains the
anomaly-based detection accuracy of DDoS attacks and port scans. The Load
Manager also preserves flows, so flow-based analysis is fully supported.
2. Dynamic Load Distribution: The Load Manager considers the current NIDPSs’
loads while distributing the traffic and it also provides a mechanism to opti-
mally move flows from one NIDPS to another when it is needed. These help
to prevent overload conditions.
3. Customizable Correlation: The Load Manager allows for adding custom corre-
lations. This feature extends the capability of the Load Manager to guarantee




The remainder of this thesis is organized into 4 chapters. Chapter 2 discusses some
of the most influential and recent research literature in the area of traffic distribution
for NIDPSs. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present the design, implementation, and
evaluation of the Load Balancer and the Load Manager, respectively. Finally,




In this chapter, related work in the area of traffic distribution for NIDPSs is pre-
sented in chronological order. Some of them are very influential works, which
pioneered the research in this area, while others are recent approaches, which rep-
resent the current research direction. For each related work, we briefly present
the approach; we then summarize the contribution; lastly, we point out how our
research inherits from the approach and enhances it.
2.1 Slicing and Reassembling Mechanism
The problem that a single NIDS cannot keep up with the network traffic volume was
examined by Kruegel et al. [18] in 2002. The authors proposed the use of clusters
of NIDSs and an architecture, which involved a traffic slicing and reassembling
mechanism, to distribute packets to the NIDSs. This work pioneered the research
in this area.
In this approach, a network tap is used to extract link-layer frames and pass
them to a scatterer. The scatterer uses a round-robin algorithm to partition the
frames to send to a set of slicers. Then, the slicers send the frames to the channels
which the NIDSs are attached to. At the channels, the frames are reassembled by
the reassemblers to make sure that the order in which they arrive at the NIDSs
is the same as their original order. The slicers choose the channels based on the
attack scenarios that the channels’ NIDSs handle. In other words, each NIDS will
receive the necessary packets for the attacks that it handles.
The main contribution of this work is the traffic partitioning scheme which
realizes the use of multiple NIDSs. This scheme distributes the load across the
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NIDSs while making sure that each NIDS receives all the packets required for its
detection; however, this work falls short in a few aspects:
• No support for anomaly-based detection: The traffic is distributed to the
NIDSs based on the predefined signatures of the attack scenarios that they
handle; thus, NIDSs are assumed to be signature-based only.
• No load balancing: Because the attack scenarios are fixed, the distribution
of traffic is static. Although the authors realized the threat of the overload
conditions and discussed one possible solution, which requires splitting and
reassigning attack scenarios in real-time, the discussion lacked technical de-
tails. Also, there was no supportive implementation.
• Unmanageable duplication: Frames might be concurrently sent to many chan-
nels due to the overlapping attack scenarios – multiple attack scenarios that
require the monitoring of the same traffic. Although the authors acknowl-
edged the duplication, there was no discussion about how much this amount
could be. This is crucial because the amount of duplication directly increases
the chance of overloading an NIDS.
In this thesis, we enhance the above approach in many ways. Besides support-
ing anomaly-based detection by using dynamic traffic distributions, both of our
solutions provide mechanisms to avoid overload conditions in real-time. One of our
solutions, the Load Manager, inherits the idea of duplicating traffic to preserve the
detection accuracy of the NIDSs; however, we clearly identify the upper bound of
the duplication, as well as validate this amount through extensive simulations.
2.2 Hash-Based Distribution with Multiple Hash
Functions
One early work that addressed the problem of overload conditions associated with
static distributions was presented by Schaelicke et al. [35] in 2005. This work
proposed the use of a dynamic distribution based on the NIDSs’ loads.
In this approach, the authors presented a load balancer with a single hash table
and multiple hash functions. During under-load conditions, one hash function is
used on flows to hash them into buckets, which are mapped to the NIDSs. When
an NIDS’s load is over a threshold, this NIDS is considered overloaded. To handle
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the overload condition, the first proposed solution is to reassign some buckets of
the overloaded NIDS to other NIDSs. The second proposed solution is to apply
additional hash functions on the flows that are hashed into buckets of the overloaded
NIDS by the first hash function, so that these flows are hashed into additional
buckets of other NIDSs.
The main contribution of this work is the idea of changing the distribution
of traffic when there is an overloaded NIDS. The goal is to remove the overload
conditions. This work, however, does not take into account traffic correlation in
its traffic distribution. Both of our approaches inherit from this work the idea
of accounting for the NIDSs’ loads while distributing the traffic. However, unlike
this work, both of our approaches take into account the traffic correlation in their
distributions.
2.3 Active Traffic Splitter
A state-of-the-art approach to distribute traffic to the NIDPSs was presented by
Xinidis et al. [43] in 2006. This work proposed that the traffic distributors should
be more active in their roles.
In this work, the authors introduced a traffic splitter with a set of active op-
erations. In particular, three operations are implemented in the traffic splitter to
improve the NIDPSs’ performance:
1. Early filtering/forwarding: Incoming packets that do not contain any intru-
sions are identified early by the traffic splitter. The traffic splitter then filters
them out immediately. This reduces the number of packets that the NIDPSs
receive, as well as eliminates the process of sending the filtered-out packets
to the NIDPSs. The resulting improvement in performance is 8 percent.
2. Locality buffering: Incoming packets are buffered and reordered by the traf-
fic splitter, so that they arrive at the NIDPSs in sequences that improve
the memory accesses of the NIDPSs, thus reducing their cache misses. The
resulting performance improvement is 10–18 percent.
3. Cumulative acknowledgment: Early filtering/forwarding requires a coordina-
tion between the traffic splitter and the NIDPSs. In particular, the NIDPSs
have to tell the traffic splitter which packets to filter/forward. Cumulative
acknowledgment utilizes a novel communication scheme between the splitter
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and the NIDPSs to reduce the amount of traffic involved in the coordination.
This results in 50–90 percent performance improvement.
The major contributions of this work are the three operations implemented in
the traffic splitter, which significantly improve the performance of the NIDPSs.
Nonetheless, in this work, the traffic splitter uses a simple hash function to dis-
tribute the traffic to the NIDPSs. This distribution results in critical drawbacks
that we have discussed: the loss of correlation information and an unbalanced load
distribution.
We consider this as an important related work because of the idea that this work
brings up: the traffic distributors should be more active in their roles. This idea
is really an important foundation of our work. In our solutions, the Load Balancer
and the Load Manager take into account both the traffic correlation and the current
NIDPSs’ loads to distribute the traffic intelligently. In other words, they are more
active and do more processing than the typical hash-based traffic distributors.
2.4 Double-Threshold Load Balancing
In 2007, Andreolini et al. [2] proposed a dynamic load balancing scheme for the
NIDSs. The proposed load balancing scheme uses two thresholds: a high threshold
and a low threshold. When the load of one of the NIDSs reaches the high threshold,
the load balancing scheme will activate. On the other hand, the low threshold is
used for two purposes:
1. Deactivation: If the loads of all the NIDSs fall below the low threshold then
the load balancing algorithm will terminate.
2. Identifying target NIDSs: Any NIDS with load lower than the low threshold
is qualified to receive the traffic load, which is moved from another overloaded
NIDS.
In addition to the two thresholds, the authors represented load of the NIDSs in
terms of the traffic rate (Mbps). Also, the authors used linear aggregation methods
to estimate the loads of the NIDSs. Moreover, they showed that the load balancing
scheme can achieve a satisfactory balance of load with a low number of activations
and deactivations.
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The main contribution of this work is the load balancing algorithm which uti-
lizes the two thresholds and the linear aggregation methods; however, similar to
the multi-hash-function approach, this load balancing scheme does not take into
account traffic correlation in its distribution.
Nevertheless, our work benefits a lot from this work. In particular, we adopt
the proposed NIDS load representation and the estimation of load using linear
aggregation methods. Being able to estimate the loads of the NIDSs is crucial
for us because we cannot do load balancing without such estimates. Lastly, our
approaches consider the traffic correlation while theirs does not.
2.5 Hash-Based Distribution with Communica-
tion
In 2007, Vallentin et al. [40] introduced a state-of-the-art cluster of NIDSs. On the
one hand, this cluster uses a simple additive hash to distribute the traffic, which
results in the already discussed drawbacks. On the other hand, the cluster imple-
ments a novel inter-NIDS communication scheme which is worthy of discussion.
In this scheme, a cluster has global variables whose values are synchronized
among all the NIDSs via communication. In particular, when a global variable
is updated at one of the NIDSs, this NIDS will send update packets to all other
NIDSs to synchronize the variable. The communication could be seen as a means
to compensate for the loss of correlation information due to distributing traffic.
The main contribution of this work is the inter-NIDS communication scheme.
However, the communication itself brings in a substantial amount of overhead in
terms of traffic generated to synchronize the global variables. Moreover, it must be
noted that the inter-NIDS communication scheme requires uniform and open-source
NIDSs. In other words, all NIDSs of the cluster must be the same and modifiable to
support the communication. In particular, the authors use Bro [31], an open-source
NIDS developed at UC Berkeley, as their NIDS of choice since Bro supports low level
communication. In the case where there are various NIDSs, or proprietary NIDSs,
such as Cisco NIDSs [7], it is difficult to establish the communication scheme.
Our approaches could be considered orthogonal to the above approach. We
choose to reduce the loss of correlation information upfront, at the time the traffic
is distributed. We also note that since our approach is independent of the NIDPSs,
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it could be applied to a cluster of any NIDPSs. Lastly, our approaches provide load
balancing while theirs does not.
2.6 Summary
In summary, all of the related work discussed above use simple distribution schemes
to distribute traffic to the NIDPSs. Two of them use the static slicing distribution
scheme [2, 18], and the others use the hash-based distribution schemes [35, 40, 43].
Some of these schemes do not take into account the current loads of the NIDPSs
when distributing the traffic; as a result, they provide no load balancing [18, 39, 43].
More importantly, none of the related work considers the loss of correlation infor-
mation when distributing the traffic. This loss of correlation information severely
reduce the anomaly-based detection accuracy of the NIDPSs. One notable ap-
proach, which uses an inter-NIDS communication scheme to compensate for the
loss of correlation information, was recently proposed by Vallentin et al. [40].
Our approaches, first and foremost, appropriately distribute the traffic to reduce
the loss of correlation information. Furthermore, we leverage the real-time loads
of the NIDPSs to provide load balancing. The load balancing provided by our





In this chapter, we present the Correlation-Based Load Balancer – our first novel
solution to the problem of traffic distribution for the NIDPSs. The objective of the
Load Balancer is to provide fine-grained load balancing while minimizing the loss
of correlation information.
To address the traffic distribution problem, we first formalize it as an optimiza-
tion problem, considering both the NIDPSs’ load variance and the loss of correlation
information. We then present our Benefit-Based Load Balancing (BLB) algorithm
as a solution to the optimization problem. This algorithm uses a novel on-line
clustering technique to distribute flows in real-time to achieve the following:
• The difference between NIDPSs’ loads is kept within a specified bound.
• Correlated flows are grouped together at a single NIDPS to reduce the loss
of correlation information.
We have implemented a prototype Load Balancer which uses the BLB algorithm.
We also evaluated the Load Balancer against various DDoS attacks and port scans.
The evaluation results show that compared to the naive hash-based distribution,
our Load Balancer significantly improves the anomaly-based detection accuracy
of these attacks while keeping the difference between loads of the NIDPSs small.
Figure 3.1 shows how our Load Balancer fits into a network topology.
As briefly discussed in Section 1.4, our Load Balancer delivers the following
features:
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Figure 3.1: Placement of the Load Balancer
1. Fine-Grained Load Balancing: Our Load Balancer monitors loads of the
NIDPSs and distributes the traffic in a way such that the difference between
NIDPSs’ loads is kept within a specified bound. This provides both protection
and better traffic engineering to the network.
2. Anomaly-Based Detection and Prevention Support: Our Load Balancer is
capable of grouping correlated flows in real-time. In particular, we focus on
grouping flows which have identical dst-ip, src-ip, or dst-port, which greatly
increases the accuracy of anomaly-based detection of DDoS attacks and port
scans. Additionally, our Load Balancer preserves flows, i.e., packets belonging
to the same flow are sent to the same NIDPS. Thus, it fully supports flow-
based analysis.
3. Configurable Security: With our Load Balancer, one might favor security, i.e.,
reduced loss of correlation information, over performance, i.e., load balancing,
when it is desirable to do so. For example, when the load of the whole system
is low, one might want to use only one NIDPS to analyze all the traffic
instead of distributing the traffic across multiple systems. Our Load Balancer
provides several ways to favor security: (1) relaxing the variance constraint,
(2) duplicating the traffic to send to multiple NIDPSs, and (3) operating with
a threshold-based constraint instead of a load-balancing-based constraint.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 contains the problem
statement and an overview of our approach. In Section 3.3, we formalize the flow
assignment problem as an optimization problem and provide an approximation for
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it. Section 3.4 explains the on-line clustering technique and describes the BLB
algorithm. Section 3.5 discusses the correlations between flows. In Sections 3.6 and
3.7, we describe the implementation and evaluation results, respectively. Finally,
we conclude this chapter in Section 3.8.
3.2 Problem Statement and Approach Overview
3.2.1 Problem Statement
Given a cluster of NIDPSs, we want to develop a load balancer which provides a
desired level of load balancing, i.e., keeps the difference between loads of the NIDPSs
within a specified bound, and minimizes the loss of correlation information due to
distributing flows, which in turn improves the anomaly-based detection accuracy
of the NIDPSs.
3.2.2 Approach Overview
The intuition of our approach is as follows: Since each NIDPS only receives a portion
of the network traffic, we want to make sure that this portion contains sufficient
information for the NIDPS to detect and prevent intrusions. In particular, we want
to send attack-correlated flows to the same NIDPS, so that no attack will be missed.
First, we introduce clusters to structure the flows. A cluster contains flows
which are closely correlated with each other. Clusters are constructed and deleted
on-the-fly depending on both the variety and the rate of the traffic. When a new
flow arrives, it can join some existing clusters or form a new cluster of its own. We
discuss on-line cluster management in detail in Section 3.4. Also, an NIDPS could
contain several clusters of flows. This means that an NIDPS could be monitoring
multiple groups of correlated flows at the same time to detect and prevent possible
intrusions.
Next, the notion of benefits is introduced as a means to measure the correlations
between a new flow and groups of previously assigned flows, or clusters. The
correlations between flows are derived from their five-tuples: src-ip, dst-ip, src-
port, dst-port, and proto. As previously mentioned in Section 1.3, we only consider
the correlations derived from these five-tuples, and other correlations derived from
packets’ payload are out of the scope of this study. We discuss the correlations in
more detail in Section 3.5.
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Benefits play very important role in our approach since we use them to assign
new flows to clusters. For example, if there are two existing clusters and a new flow
comes, we will assign this new flow to the cluster which gives a better benefit. In
other words, the new flow is assigned to the cluster which is more strongly correlated
with it.
Load balancing is achieved by closely monitoring the loads of all the NIDPSs
and assigning flows to them correspondingly. A load balancing level is described
using a variance. Specifically, a small value of variance indicates a high level of
load balancing and vice versa.
We summarize our approach as follows: Flows in NIDPSs are organized as
clusters and a desired level of load balancing is specified as a variance constraint.
When a new flow comes, we find candidate NIDPSs which satisfy the variance
constraint. Then, among clusters of these NIDPSs, we assign the new flow to
the ones which give the best benefits. By assigning flows this way, we achieve
the highest amount of correlation information possible while keeping the difference
between NIDPSs’ loads within a bound.
3.3 Problem Formalization
In this section, we first describe how the problem of assigning new flows is formalized
as an optimization problem. We then show that the problem is NP-hard; thus, it
cannot be solved in polynomial time. We subsequently present an approximation
for the optimization problem. Finally, we discuss how our formalization could be
fine-tuned to favor security over performance when required.
3.3.1 Flow Assignment Optimization Problem
Here we formalize the problem of assigning new flows as an optimization problem.
At time t, let n be the number of NIDPSs and m be the number of clusters. The
mapping between the NIDPSs and the clusters is one-to-many. For each NIDPS
i (i ∈ [1, n]), let
−→
Gi be a vector of size m whose j
th element (j ∈ [1,m]) is 1 if
NIDPS i owns cluster j and 0 otherwise.
Now let f be the new flow. Assigning f to a cluster j gives a benefit Bj.
Essentially, this benefit reflects how much f and the flows in cluster j are correlated.
Let
−→
B be a vector of size m whose jth element is the benefit Bj.
16
Next, let Li denote the current load of NIDPS i in the system. An NIDPS’s load
is expressed as the amount of traffic it handles per second (Mbps). We estimate
the load by taking periodic samples of the traffic going to each NIDPS and apply
the standard Single Exponential Moving Average (SEMA) [30] to the samples to
alleviate the negative effect of spikes in traffic. This linear aggregation method
was shown to perform very well in the context of NIDPS load balancing [2], as we
discussed in Section 2.4.
In addition, we note that representing an NIDPS’s load is a nontrivial task
since an NIDPS may have numerous hardware and software resources, for example,
CPU, disk, and memory. Therefore, one might challenge our load representation;
however, the representation we use is the most common approach in the context of
network intrusion detection and prevention [2, 35, 43].
In the following, let µ be the average load of all the NIDPSs and V be the
upper bound for the variance after the assignment. Let Lf be the predicted load
of the new flow. Here, SEMA is utilized on sampling flows to make predictions for
incoming TCP and UDP flows separately.
Let F be the maximum number of NIDPSs which f could be assigned to con-
currently. Assigning f to multiple NIDPSs could give more benefit because f might
be correlated to multiple clusters maintained by different NIDPSs. For example,
assume that there are two clusters, assigned to two different NIDPSs, one monitor-
ing flows with dst-ip 10.0.0.1 and the other monitoring flows with dst-port 80. If f
has both dst-ip 10.0.0.1 and dst-port 80 then it is desirable to assign this flow to
both of the NIDPSs.
Finally, let
−→
X be the solution vector of size m. The jth element of
−→
X is 1 if f
is going to be assigned to cluster j and 0 otherwise. In order to determine which
clusters to assign f to, we have to solve the Flow Assignment Optimization Problem
(FAOP) specified in Figure 3.2.
Our optimization problem is a Non-linear Binary Integer Programming problem.
Expression (1) states that we want to maximize the total benefit. Constraint (2)
requires that f be concurrently assigned to at most F NIDPSs. Constraint (3)
requires that f be assigned to at most one cluster of each NIDPS. Finally, constraint
(4) requires that the variance of the NIDPSs’ loads after the assignment be less than
or equal to the desired variance V . A small value of V means a high level of load
balancing is expected while a high value of V indicates otherwise.
For instance, if V is set at 9 (%2 load), and load is assumed to be normally







































X : Solution vector of size m
−→
B : Benefit vector of size m
−→
Gi : Cluster-ownership vector of size m of NIDPS i−→
I : Vector of 1’s of size m
F : Maximum number of NIDPSs to assign f
Li : Load of NIDPS i
µ : Average load of all NIDPSs
Lf : Predicted load of f
V : Upper bound for the new variance
Figure 3.2: Flow Assignment Optimization Problem
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Algorithm 1 HeuristicFlowAssignment(f)
1: solution set = ∅
2: nidps set = all NIDPSs
3: for i from 1 to F do
4: cluster set = all clusters of nidps set
5: find cluster in cluster set
- which satisfies variance constraint
- and has the biggest benefit
6: if no cluster found then
7: quit for loop
8: end if
9: solution set = solution set ∪ cluster
10: nidps = NIDPS which has cluster
11: update load of nidps
12: nidps set = nidps set \ nidps
13: end for
14: return solution set
within 3
√
V = 9 (% load) of the average load µ, or within 18 (% load) of each
other.
3.3.2 Heuristic Flow Assignment Algorithm
In order to solve FAOP, one has to examine all the cluster subsets, whose sizes
are less than or equal to F . As a result, any algorithm which optimally solves
FAOP would take at least polynomial (greater than linear) time. Due to the real-
time requirement of the flow assignment, we propose a greedy-based approximation
algorithm, the Heuristic Flow Assignment (HFA) algorithm, to solve the FAOP in
linear time. The HFA algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 1. This algorithm searches
for a cluster giving the maximum benefit and satisfying the constraints at the same
time. This can be done in O(m) time, and it tries to do this up to F times (Line
3–13). We also note that when F equals 1, the result of the HFA algorithm is the
optimal solution to the FAOP.
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3.3.3 Configurable Security
When it is desirable to favor security, i.e., reduced loss of correlation information,
over performance, i.e., load balancing, our formalization provides three possible
approaches:
1. Relaxing variance constraint: Setting V high loosens the load balancing re-
quirement; thus, a higher benefit might be achieved. In the extreme, V could
be set high enough so that load balancing is completely ignored. In this case,
the traffic is distributed based solely on the benefit, resulting in the use of
only one NIDPS. This might be a desirable setting when the traffic load is
low.
2. Duplicating flows: A high value of F reduces the loss of correlation informa-
tion because flows are duplicated up to F times to be sent to the NIDPSs.
However, the duplication of flows consumes system resources like bandwidth
and CPU load; therefore, it must be used selectively.
3. Threshold-based load distribution: The load balancing requirement could be
replaced by a threshold-based requirement, which requires the NIDPSs’ loads
to be kept below a certain threshold Tload. This requirement is easier to satisfy
and gives more room to obtain higher benefits. Threshold-based load distri-
bution could be readily achieved by replacing constraint (4) with a simpler
constraint:




Gi) < Tload ,∀i ∈ [1, n] .
Compared to this threshold-based approach, the Load Balancer’s approach,
which keeps the difference between NIDPSs’ loads within a bound, provides
better load balancing. In particular, when using this threshold-based ap-
proach, clusters are more likely to have an overloaded NIDPS even when the
other NIDPSs’ loads are low; this is because all traffic is sent to a NIDPS
to achieve the best benefit until this NIDPS’s load is high, rather than dis-
tributed to all of the available NIDPSs.
In summary, F and V could be set high, along with using the threshold-based
load distribution, to reduce the loss of correlation information and ultimately in-
crease the detection and prevention accuracy. However, because these configura-
tions compromise the performance, they should be used selectively depending on
the current traffic load, system resources, and performance requirements.
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3.4 On-line Clustering Technique
Managing clusters is a central activity of our Load Balancer. Because of the real-
time requirement, it is not possible to manage clusters using traditional clustering
techniques like K-Means [16] or K-Medoids [16]. Thus, we have customized an on-
line clustering technique introduced by Aggarwal et al. [1] to create a suitable one
for our Load Balancer. Specifically, we have integrated into the existing technique
several new concepts: benefit, cluster weight, and decay of weight.
3.4.1 Benefit Calculation
When a new flow arrives, we calculate the benefits of adding this flow to the existing
clusters to make assignment decisions. The benefits vary depending on two factors:
the correlations between the flow and the clusters; and the weights of the clusters.
First, the correlations between the new flow and the existing clusters are deter-
mined based on the correlations between the flow and the centroids of those clusters,
where a centroid of a cluster is a flow representing the cluster. The correlations
between flows are described in detail subsequently.
Secondly, weights of clusters represent the activeness of the clusters and the
number of flows that the clusters have. The less active a cluster is or the fewer
flows the cluster has, the less weight it has. In order to reflect those properties,
weights of clusters decay over time and are updated every time the clusters receive
a new flow. More details about the decay and update of weights are provided
subsequently.
Let D(f, cj) be the logical distance between a new flow f and the centroid cj
of cluster j, where the logical distance between two flows is a value reflecting how
correlated the two flows are (the logical distance notion is discussed in detail in
Section 3.5), and let Wj be the current weight of cluster j. The benefit of adding
f to cluster j is calculated as follows:
Bj = (1−D(f, cj))Wj .
This formula is constructed to provide the following properties:
• The closer f is to cj, i.e., the more correlated f and cj are, the higher benefit
the assignment gives because of the larger 1−D(f, cj)
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• The heavier the cluster j is, i.e., the more active the cluster is or the more
flows the cluster has, the higher benefit the assignment gives because of the
larger Wj.
3.4.2 Cluster Weight
Each cluster has a weight, whose value is between 0 and 1 inclusive. When a
cluster is first constructed, it has weight 1. For each cluster j, we keep track of
these variables: the number of flows it has, sj, its construction time or the last
time it received a new flow, tj,f , its weight at this time, Wj,tj,f , and the last time
it received a packet, tj,p. For instance, at time t0 when cluster j is constructed,
sj = 1, tj,f = tj,p = t0, and Wj,tj,f = 1.
The weight of a cluster decays when the cluster is inactive, i.e., when it does
not receive network traffic. In particular, if a cluster j has not received any packet




where λ > 1 is the decaying factor. We introduce the decay of weight as a means
to better group recent flows, as well as to manage the number of clusters in the
system.
In particular, with the decay of weight, when a new flow arrives, it is more likely
to be assigned to more active and recent clusters. This is because these clusters
have higher weights due to less decay. For example, let ta,p and tb,p be the times
clusters a and b received their last packets, respectively. If ta,p > tb,p, i.e., cluster a
received the last packet more recently than cluster b, then at a later time t, cluster a
has decayed less than cluster b due to a smaller decaying duration: t−ta,p < t−tb,p.
Furthermore, if clusters are inactive for a long period of time, they have very
low weights due to the decay. As a result, we can delete these clusters by setting a
minimum weight threshold Tweight and deleting any cluster whose weight is less than
this threshold. The deletion of old clusters is necessary to give room for more recent
clusters and to make sure that the maintained clusters in the system represent the
recent traffic.








sj = sj + 1 ,
tj,f = tj,p = t ,
Wj,tj,f = Wj,t .
If at time t, there were no new flow added to cluster j then its weight would
equal λ(tj,p−t)Wj,tj,f , according to Equation 3.1. However, since f is added to it, its
weight increases by the amount [1− λ(tj,p−t)Wj,tj,f ]
1−D(f,cj)
sj+1
, according to Equation
3.2. Consequently, adding a new flow to a cluster essentially increases the cluster’s
weight.
The increment amount depends on both the correlation between the new flow
and the cluster – the D(f, cj), as well as the number of flows that the cluster already
has – the sj. In particular, the more correlated with the cluster the new flow is,
i.e., the smaller D(f, cj), the more weight it adds to the cluster. In contrast, the
more flows that the cluster already has, i.e., the larger sj, the less weight the new
flow adds to the cluster. It must be noted that as a cluster becomes large, the
increment of weight becomes insignificant due to the large sj. As a result, this
increment eventually can not compensate for the loss of weight due to the decay to
keep the cluster alive.
In summary, the increment of weight ensures that clusters with more flows and
clusters with flows which are more correlated have heavier weights than the others.
Ultimately, this ensures that any new flow is more likely to be assigned to more
dense clusters due to better benefits.
3.4.3 Benefit-Based Load Balancing Algorithm
The Benefit-Based Load Balancing (BLB) algorithm, which is used to distribute
traffic intelligently to the NIDPSs, is the heart of the Load Balancer. This algorithm
ties together all the details presented in this chapter. We summarize the BLB
algorithm in Algorithm 2 and describe it below.
When there is a new flow f , we use the HFA algorithm to solve the FAOP to get
a candidate set of clusters (Line 1). If the FAOP has no solution or this solution
gives a benefit below a predefined threshold Tbenefit, then a new cluster, whose
centroid is f and weight equals 1, is created. This cluster is added to the NIDPS
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Algorithm 2 Benefit-BasedLoadBalancing(f)
1: C = HeuristicFlowAssignment(f)
2: if C = ∅ or Benefit(C) < Tbenefit then
3: create a cluster (centroid f , weight 1)
4: assign it to the lowest load NIDPS
5: else
6: assign f to the clusters in C
7: update those clusters
8: end if
with the lowest load (Line 2–4). In the other case, f is added to the candidate
clusters and these clusters are updated appropriately (Line 5–7).
3.5 Flow Correlations
The correlations between flows are essential to our benefit calculation. In this
section, we explain how the correlations are measured by a logical distance. We
first present a general formula for the logical distance. Afterward, we thoroughly
describe the components of the formula.
3.5.1 Logical Distance Formula
Given two flows f1 and f2, the logical distance between the two flows, which indi-
cates how closely correlated they are, is formally defined as follows:
D(f1, f2) = αip δip(f1, f2) + αport δport(f1, f2) + αprotocol δprotocol(f1, f2) ,
where δip(f1, f2), δport(f1, f2), δprotocol(f1, f2) are the logical distances given by the
IP addresses, port numbers, and protocols of the two flows respectively; and the
α’s are their weights.
The δip(f1, f2) reflects the correlations between the source IP addresses, as well
as the destination IP addresses of the two flows f1 and f2. On the other hand,
δport(f1, f2) mainly concerns with the correlations between the destination ports
of the two flows. This is because the source ports play an insignificant role in
anomaly-based detection.
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Figure 3.3: Matching Order of Correlations given by IP Addresses, Port Numbers,
and Protocols
Through detection scenarios that we conducted, we observe that the IP ad-
dresses’ and port numbers’ correlations play more important roles than the proto-
cols’ correlation. As a result, weights of the IP addresses and port numbers should
be heavier than that of the protocols. We suggest 0.4 - 0.5 as a range for both αip
and αport, and αprotocol = 1− (αip + αport) .
3.5.2 Logical Distance Components
Logical Distance given by IP Addresses – δip()
We match the correlation given by IP addresses of two flows with the following
correlations: identical, subnet, and configuration correlations. δip() returns a value
between 0 and 1 corresponding to the matching. The correlations are defined as
follows:
• Identical Correlation: If source IP addresses or destination IP addresses of
two flows are identical then their correlation matches the identical correlation.
This correlation is the most important correlation between two flows. For
example, in a DDoS attack scenario, numerous source IP addresses might be
used for the attack [27]. However, computers corresponding to those source
IP addresses attack the same target. Because flows of the attack all have the
same destination IP address, they have the identical correlation.
• Subnet Correlation: If source IP addresses or destination IP addresses of
two flows belong to the same subnet or virtual LAN, then their correlation
matches the subnet correlation.
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In practice, attackers often try to find vulnerabilities in different computers
in a target network; thus, attack-correlated flows are sent to the same network.
Identifying this type of correlation helps to group these flows together to
detect and prevent the intrusions.
• Configuration Correlation: If source IP addresses or destination IP addresses
of two flows belong to a predefined set of addresses then their correlation
matches the configuration correlation.
For instance, it is sometimes of interest to group flows going to the unused
address space together to detect suspicious activities. This correlation allows
the grouping of these flows in particular, and the grouping of flows of any
specified set of addresses in general.
Figure 3.3 shows the order in which the matching is done. Going from top to
bottom, the significances of the correlations decrease, so the values returned by
δip() increase.
Logical Distance given by Port Numbers – δport()
Because destination port numbers represent target services, they play a more im-
portant role than source port numbers. As a result, we concentrate on investigating
the correlations of the destination port numbers instead of the source port numbers.
Similar to the IP address case, in order to determine a value between 0 and 1 which
δport() returns, we match the correlation between two destination port numbers
with one of the following correlations:
• Identical Correlation: If destination port numbers of two flows are identical
then their correlation matches the identical correlation.
This correlation supports the detection and prevention of intrusions tar-
geting a particular service provided by a number of computers. For example,
flows belonging to an attack aiming at multiple web servers all have 80 as
their destination port number.
• Functional Correlation: If destination port numbers of two flows are func-
tionally correlated then their correlation matches the functional correlation.
For example, flows belonging to an FTP connection have both destination
port numbers 20 and 21. Thus, it is desirable to group these flows together. It
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is also possible to use the configuration correlation, which is discussed below,
to group these flows together.
• Configuration Correlation: If destination port numbers of two flows belong
to a predefined set of port numbers then their correlation matches the con-
figuration correlation.
In practice, the administrators might want to group together flows belong-
ing to different services, for instance, telnet and web, to detect certain attacks.
This correlation enables them to do so.
Logical Distance given by Protocol – δprotocol()
Either 0 or 1 is returned by δprotocol(), depending on the following correlation:
• Identical Correlation: If protocols of two flows are the same then they have
the identical correlation.
3.6 Implementation
We have implemented a prototype Load Balancer, which can distribute the traffic
to the NIDPSs in real-time. In addition, in order to evaluate the Load Balancer, we
implemented a DDoS detector. We describe our implementations in detail below.
3.6.1 Load Balancer
The prototype Load Balancer was developed using the libpcap library [22] – a library
for capturing and sending network packets directly from and to network interfaces
in real-time. The BLB algorithm was implemented as the default load balancing
algorithm. The identical correlations given by IP addresses, port numbers, and
protocol were initially supported.
Besides the BLB algorithm, for comparison purposes, we also integrated a hash-
based algorithm into our Load Balancer. As discussed in Chapter 2, various hash-
based algorithms were used by others [31, 35, 43] to distribute the traffic and they
all shared a common property: applying a simple hash function on a subset of
the five-tuples. Hence, we implemented the hash-based algorithm using a simple
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additive hash: (src-ip + dst-ip + src-port + dst-port) mod n, where n is the number
of NIDPSs.
For the simulations, our Load Balancer was run on a system with an Intel Dual
Core 2.0 GHz CPU, 2 GB RAM, 2× 1 Gbps NICs. The Load Balancer operates as
follows: first it gets a new packet from a specified source, which could be a network
interface or a trace file; it then executes either the BLB or the hash-based algorithm
to identify which NIDPS(s) to send this packet to; finally, it sends the packet to
the corresponding network interface(s) or writes the packet to the corresponding
trace file(s).
3.6.2 DDoS Detector
For evaluation purposes, a DDoS detector was developed using the Cumulative Sum
algorithm – a simple and robust algorithm to detect DDoS proposed by T. Peng
et al. [32]. Fundamentally, this algorithm detects the change of the mean value of
the percentage of new source IP addresses over time. A sequence {Yn} is used to
characterize the change. If at any time, a value of {Yn} is bigger than a predefined
threshold Ty, then an attack is detected.
3.7 Evaluation
3.7.1 Performance
In order to evaluate how well our Load Balancer distributes the traffic, we needed
high volume traffic traces. Consequently, we chose two weeks of GPS-synchronized
IP header traces, which were captured in December 2003 at the University of Auck-
land by the National Laboratory for Applied Network Research (NLANR) [29].
We note that because of privacy issues, the traces were sanitized by NLANR.
The IP addresses were mapped into the network space 10.X.X.X in a non-reversible
way. However, the mapping was one-to-one, which meant IP addresses identical in
the traces were identical in the real world. Thus, we could still identify the identical
correlation given by IP addresses. Identical correlations given by port numbers and
protocols were unaffected by this sanitization.
The trace used in both of the below simulations was an hour trace captured from
12:00 to 13:00 on Tuesday, December 2nd, 2003. This hour was one of the busiest
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Figure 3.4: Effect of the Number of Clusters on the System Overhead
hours of the network. During this hour, there were 200 new flows per second and
14 Mbps of traffic on average [37].
Effect of the Number of Clusters on the System Overhead
Here we examine the effect of the number of clusters on the system overhead. The
number of clusters maintained in the Load Balancer is dependent on the threshold
Tweight and the decay rate λ. In this simulation, λ was fixed at 1.1, and Tweight was
varied to get the desired number of maintained clusters. There were 10 NIDPSs,
each of which had a capacity of 3 Mbps; V was 25; F was 1; αip and αport were 0.5
and αprotocol was 0; Tbenefit was 0.1; and the Load Balancer used the BLB algorithm.
For each flow, when its first packet arrives at the Load Balancer, the Load
Balancer has to perform a calculation to determine to which cluster(s) to assign the
flow. This is the primary system overhead associated with the flow. We measured
this overhead by the delay introduced to the first packet of the flow, which was the
time to run the BLB algorithm. The measurement was done as follows:
For every packet read from the trace file, the Load Balancer checked if it be-
longed to previously assigned flows. If it did not, BLB algorithm was then used
to assign this packet; in this case, the difference between the timestamps taken
after and before the execution of the BLB algorithm was recorded. This difference
was the overhead introduced to this packet, which starts a new flow, by the Load
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Figure 3.5: Effect of the Algorithms on the Variance
Balancer. The timestamps were taken using the Java function System.nanoTime().
We also note that the packets were not actually sent to the NIDPSs since it was
not necessary.
Figure 3.4 plots the delays of the first packets of a sampling of 100 consecutive
flows when the system maintained 500, 750, and 1000 clusters. The average delays
of the full trace were 0.58, 0.80, and 1.31 milliseconds respectively (not shown in
the figure). This result indicates that the higher the number of clusters, the higher
the delays. This is because it takes more time to calculate the benefits when there
are more clusters. Also, the spikes happened when there was a significant number
of clusters that satisfied the variance constraint, which increased the execution time
of the BLB algorithm. In summary, the delay per flow introduced by our system is
on the order of a millisecond, which is tolerable.
Effect of the Algorithms on the Variance
We carried out this experiment to examine how different algorithms affect the
NIDPSs’ load variance. In this experiment, the Load Balancer maintained 500
clusters and used both the BLB and the hash-based algorithms. There were 10
NIDPSs, each of which had a capacity of 3 Mbps; λ was 1.1; Tbenefit was 0.1; αip
and αport were 0.5 and αprotocol was 0; F was 1; and V was 16. We note that
because the trace only contained packet headers, we uniformly generated packet
30
payload having sizes between 400 and 600 bytes. This is to preserve the overall
traffic rate of 14 Mbps of the trace file.
Throughout the experiment, we recorded the loads of the NIDPSs to calculate
the variance. For each NIDPS, we take a sample of the traffic going to it every 1
second to estimate its load. For the Single Exponential Moving Average [30], the
number of samples for the initial calculation is s = 30. In other words, the first
estimated load is the mean of 30 initial samples of load. Also, the smoothing factor
is α = 2
s+1
. The smoothing factor is essentially the weight of the current load in
the estimation:
estimated load = α · current load + (1− α) · last load .
Figure 3.5 plots the variance associated with the two algorithms at every 2
seconds during a sampling of 60 seconds. We observed that the variance of the
hash-based algorithm was noticeably higher than that of the BLB algorithm. This
indicated that the loads of the NIDPSs when the hash-based algorithm was used
were substantially unbalanced. Also, our BLB algorithm often had variance less
than V ; however, there were occasions when the variance was bigger than V . These
were points of time at which there was no solution to the FAOP.
In summary, the result of this simulation shows that our BLB algorithm has a
solid performance in terms of keeping the variance low in comparison to the hash-
based algorithm. Most importantly, the BLB algorithm is often able to keep the
variance below the specified upper bound V .
3.7.2 Security
Three simulations were conducted to evaluate how the BLB algorithm supports the
detections of DDoS attacks and port scans compared to the hash-based algorithm.
For the BLB algorithm, the Load Balancer maintained 500 clusters; λ was 1.1;
Tbenefit was 0.1; αip and αport were 0.5 and αprotocol was 0; NIDPS capacity was 10
Mbps; V was 25; and F was 1. The Load Balancer was used to distribute traffic to
10 NIDPSs.
In the simulations, the protected internal network was a Class B network – a
network which has 65534 addresses, each of which has a leading bit string “10”.
10% of the address space was occupied. The generated background traffic was
about 15 Mbps with 100 flows per second on average. The source and destination
addresses were randomly generated such that 80% of the flows were from or to 20%
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of the machines in the internal network. Packets had sizes uniformly distributed
from 500 to 1500 bytes. Flows’ durations were uniformly distributed from 1 to 30
seconds.
DDoS Attack
We simulated a large scale UDP flood attack [36], which involved 9000 distinct
attacking hosts and a victim. Each UDP packet was of fixed size 1 KB, and its
source port and destination port were randomly selected. The simulation lasted
60 seconds, during which there were both background traffic and the attack traffic.
The attack started at second 20 and lasted for 30 seconds. During the attack, the
victim saw about 300 new source IP addresses of the attack traffic per second.
Figure 3.6 plots the highest fractions of new source IP addresses observable by
one of the NIDPSs in the following three settings: (1) a single NIDPS without the
Load Balancer, (2) 10 NIDPSs with the Load Balancer using the BLB algorithm,
and (3) 10 NIDPSs with the Load Balancer using the hash-based algorithm. We
note that when the single NIDPS was used, we assumed that it could handle all
the traffic without dropping packets. The corresponding values of Yn are shown in
Figure 3.7.
It can be observed that during the attack, when the BLB algorithm was used,
the fractions of new source IP addresses observable by one of the NIDPSs were
significantly higher than those when the hash-based algorithm was used. This was
because a substantially higher number of attack flows went to the same NIDPS
when the BLB was used. The higher fractions over time resulted in the higher
values of Yn. Thus, there would be scenarios when the hash-based algorithm failed
to detect the attack but the BLB algorithm succeeded.
For example, if the threshold Ty was set to 3 then the hash-based algorithm
would fail to detect the DDoS attack. This is because Yn was always below Ty.
However, the BLB algorithm detected the attack at second 38, which was 4 seconds
later than when a single NIDPS without the Load Balancer was used. In the case
when the single NIDPS was used, the attack was detected earlier because all flows
of the attack went to this NIDPS.
This evaluation, however, has several limitations. First, the success of the detec-
tion strongly depends on the arbitrarily chosen Ty. Secondly, given the importance
of Ty on the success of the detection, this evaluation lacks a thorough investigation
of Ty. As a result, in order to characterize the benefit of the BLB algorithm more
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Figure 3.6: Effect of the Algorithms on the Fraction of New Source IP Addresses
per Second
Figure 3.7: Effect of the Algorithms on the Value of Yn
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accurately, we plan to answer the following question in future work:
• Given a good sampling of traffic and a reasonable distance between a Ty of
the normal traffic and a Ty of the attack traffic, what is the probability of a
successful detection for a well chosen Ty?
In conclusion, this evaluation result shows that the BLB algorithm distributes
the traffic in a way which increases the detection accuracy of the DDoS attack sig-
nificantly compared to the hash-based algorithm. Also, this evaluation has several
limitations that are the subjects of future work.
Port Scans
For this part, we used Snort [34] as our scan detector. From version 2.6, the
Snort preprocessor sfPortscan takes care of detecting port scans. By analyzing the
anomaly of the traffic, sfPortscan can detect the following scans [6]:
• Portscan: A small number of scanning hosts, scanning one victim, for a lot
of ports.
• Portsweep: A small number of scanning hosts, scanning many victims, for a
small number of ports.
• Decoy Portscan: A high number of scanning hosts with a few spoofed hosts,
scanning a small number of hosts, for a small number of ports.
• Distributed Portscan: Similar to Decoy Portscan but with a high number of
ports.
We note that sophisticated scans, such as decoy portscans and distributed port-
scans, might not be well supported by the Load Balancer because of the diversity of
these scans’ flows. In order to support the detection of these scans, it might be ben-
eficial to monitor the number of connection attempts to unused address space of the
protected networks. The Load Balancer can support the grouping of flows of these
connection attempts by specifying the unused address space in its configuration
correlations.
In practice, sophisticated scans currently have low detection accuracy (high false
positive rate) [6]. In other words, current NIDPSs do not support them well. As a
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Figure 3.8: The Highest Number of SYN Packets Observable by One of the NIDPSs
During the Portscan
Figure 3.9: The Highest Number of SYN Packets Observable by One of the NIDPSs
During the Portsweep
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result, in this evaluation, we focus on evaluating how our Load Balancer supports
the detection of ordinary portscans and portsweeps.
For both of the following simulations, the background traffic was the same as in
the previous DDoS simulation. Similarly, when a single NIDPS without the Load
Balancer was used, we assumed that no packets were dropped. Also, the sensitivity
level of sfPortscan was set at medium, and TCP SYN scans were used. Lastly,
the scans were designed so that a single NIDPS without the Load Balancer always
successfully detected them.
First we used nmap [28] to carry out a portscan. We used one host to scan ports
1–1000 of one victim. When a single NIDPS was used, it detected this portscan.
When there were 10 NIDPSs and the hash-based algorithm was used, no attack was
detected; however, when the BLB algorithm was used, the attack was detected.
When the hash-based algorithm was used, the highest number of SYN packets
observable by one of the NIDPSs was about 100. This was not enough for the
sfPortScan to trigger a portscan alert. However, when the BLB algorithm was
used, one NIDPS observed up to 700 SYN packets; thus, it generated a portscan
alert. These numbers are plotted in Figure 3.8.
Secondly, we used nmap to carry out a portsweep. We used one host to scan
port 80 of 100 victims. When a single NIDPS without the Load Balancer was
used, it detected this portsweep. When there were 10 NIDPSs and the hash-based
algorithm was used, no attack was detected. In this case, we noticed that each
NIDPS observed about 10 SYN packets, targeting port 80 of 10 different victims.
This number was not high enough for the sfPortscan to trigger a portsweep alert.
On the other hand, when the BLB algorithm was used, one NIDPS observed as
many as 80 SYN packets; thus, it generated a portsweep alert. These numbers are
plotted in Figure 3.9.
One might argue that the sfPortscan’s mechanism to detect port scans is naive
and simple and that a better mechanism should be used in our evaluation. Nonethe-
less, this simplicity represents commonly used techniques for detecting port scans
and for anomaly-based detection in general. To the best of our knowledge, the
mechanism used by two other popular operational NIDPSs: Bro [31, 40] and Cisco
IPS [7], are similarly simple in terms of detecting port scans. As future work, we
plan to evaluate our Load Balancer with advanced port scan detection techniques,
such as the one proposed by Jung et al. [15].
In summary, both the portscan and the portsweep went undetected when the
hash-based algorithm was used to distribute the traffic. In contrast, when the BLB
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algorithm was used, the cluster of NIDPSs successfully detected both of them.
Consequently, this shows that our Load Balancer using the BLB algorithm can
substantially improve the detection accuracy of portscans and portsweeps compared
to the hash-based algorithm.
3.7.3 Number of Clusters
We conducted a simulation to evaluate the effect of the number of maintained
clusters on the security. In particular, we want to evaluate how the number of
maintained clusters affects the grouping of scan flows.
In this simulation, the network model and the background traffic were similar
to the ones in Section 3.7.2. Recall that the background traffic had about 100
flows per second and was about 15 Mbps. There were 10 NIDPSs, each of which
had capacity of 10 Mbps. The Load Balancer distributed traffic using the BLB
algorithm. λ was 1.1; Tbenefit was 0.1; αip and αport were 0.5 and αprotocol was 0;
and F was 1.
We set V to 25. V was set high enough so that the variance of the NIDPSs
during the simulation was always less than V . This was to eliminate the negative
effect of the variance of the NIDPSs on the distribution of the scan packets because
if the variance constraint could not be satisfied then any new flow would be assigned
to the NIDPS with the lowest load regardless of the benefit.
For the simulation, we varied the weight threshold Tweight to get the desired
number of maintained clusters: 500, 1000, and 1500. We first let the Load Balancer
distribute just the background traffic for 60 seconds. We then generated a TCP
SYN scan, which consisted of 1024 packets and scanned port 1–1024 of a victim.
There were two settings used for the scan duration: 5 and 60 seconds. During the
scan, the Load Balancer distributed the scan packets in addition to the background
traffic. We recorded the assignment of the scan packets.
Fast Scans
Figure 3.10 plots the distribution of the scan packets when the number of main-
tained clusters was 500, 1000, and 1500; and when the scan duration was 5 seconds.
It can be observed from this figure that in all three cases, the percentage of the
highest number of the scan packets that one NIDPS received was about 80%. We
conclude that the number of maintained clusters did not affect the grouping of
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Figure 3.10: The Distribution of the Scan Packets of the 5-Second Scan
Figure 3.11: The Distribution of the Scan Packets of the 60-Second Scan
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flows of this 5-second scan. In general, this evaluation result implies that the Load
Balancer works well with fast scans.
Slow Scans
Figure 3.11 plots the distribution of the scan packets when the scan duration was 60
seconds. It can be observed from this figure that packets of the scan were scattered.
The spread of the scan packets was due to new clusters that were created during the
scan. These new clusters might give higher benefit than the clusters which received
part of the scans; thus, some scan packets were distributed to the new clusters.
The overall result was the spread of scan packets.
Furthermore, Figure 3.11 also indicates that the percentage of the highest num-
ber of scan packets that one NIDPS received slightly increases when the number
of maintained clusters increases. This was because the more clusters maintained in
the systems, the less likely new clusters would be created. Thus, the new clusters
created during the scan would have less effect on the distribution of the scan pack-
ets. Nevertheless, the small improvement in grouping might not justify the large
overhead that the large number of clusters creates, especially, since the system
overhead increases linearly with the number of maintained clusters as discussed in
Section 3.7.1.
In summary, this evaluation result shows that the Load Balancer does not work
well with slow scans. In particular, it could not group flows of the 60-second
scan well even when the load balancing constraint was waived. This indicates the
limitation of the proposed cluster dynamics. In order to support the grouping
of flows of slow scans well, the proposed cluster dynamics must be revised. This
remains as future work.
3.7.4 Traffic Duplication
All the previous experiments were conducted to gain a fundamental understanding
of the performance and the security of the Load Balancer. As such, we started with
a basic configuration, which involves setting F = 1. This essentially does not allow
any packet duplication.
A value of F higher than 1 will at least double the system overhead – the amount
of time required to make the assignment decision. This is because Algorithm 1, the
Heuristic Flow Assignment algorithm, now has to execute the “for” loop at least
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two times and this loop is the most time consuming task of the whole process of
making assignment decisions.
On the other hand, there is very little that we can tell about the variance of the
systems when changing the value of F . This is because the loads of the NIDPSs are
now completely different from those when setting F = 1 due to additional traffic
from the duplication.
Finally, a value of F higher than 1 might improve the detection accuracy of the
port scans and DDoS attacks since it might send more attack flows to the same
NIDPS compared to the situation with F = 1. With F = 1, the Load Balancer is
already able to send about 70% of the attack flows to the same NIDPS. A higher
value of F, therefore, might improve the grouping to above 70%.
In summary, the effect of F on the variance and the detection accuracy needs
additional experiments. This remains as future work, as indicated in Section 5.2
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we detail the Correlation-Based Load Balancer – our first solution to
the traffic distribution problem. We first formalize the traffic distribution problem
as an optimization problem. We then present a novel Benefit-Based Load Balancing
algorithm as a solution to it. This algorithm thoroughly considers both the load
variation of the NIDPSs and the loss of correlation information due to distribut-
ing traffic. Our algorithm performs real-time optimization, thus it accommodates
intrusion detection systems as well as intrusion prevention systems.
We have implemented a prototype Load Balancer which uses the BLB algorithm.
Our Load Balancer intends to achieve the following properties:
• The difference between the NIDPSs’ loads are kept within a specified bound.
• Correlated flows are grouped together at a single system to reduce the loss of
correlation information. In particular, we focus on grouping flows which have
identical dst-ip, src-ip, or dst-port.
Extensive simulations with real traffic traces and major attacks showed that
our Load Balancer using the BLB distribution algorithm could achieve high perfor-
mance and provide enhanced security. In particular, it has low overhead and can
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keep the load variances below the desired levels of load balancing. More impor-
tantly, compared to the naive hash-based distribution, it significantly improves the
accuracy of anomaly-based detection of DDoS attacks and port scans. Nevertheless,
the evaluation results also point out a limitation of the proposed Load Balancer:
The Load Balancer does not work well with slow scans. This is an open problem





We first started with the Load Balancer. At the time, our main focus was to spread
the traffic load evenly to the NIDPSs, i.e., to keep the difference between the loads
of the NIDPSs within a bound, and the traffic correlation took a back seat. We did
not focus much on the security of the cluster.
After experimenting with this idea, we realized that we should have focused
on security as long as there is no overloaded NIDPS. This is because security –
detecting and preventing attacks – is the most important goal of the NIDPSs. As
a result, we developed the Load Manager with the security as its main focus.
In particular, from the evaluation of the Load Balancer, we learned that provid-
ing load balancing is a challenging task. Sometimes the Load Balancer could not
achieve its load balancing goal, i.e., keeping the difference between the NIDPSs’
loads within a bound. This was illustrated by the points of time at which the
variance of the NIDPSs was above the upper bound for variance in the evaluation
done in Section 3.7.1.
Furthermore, the Load Balancer tries its best to group attack-correlated flows
together; however, it does not guarantee the grouping of all of them. Thus, some of
the attack-correlated flows will not be sent to the desired NIDPSs. Consequently,
it is possible that attacks go through the NIDPSs undetected. For example, in the
evaluation done in Section 3.7.2, if the threshold Ty was set at 6 then the DDoS
attack would not be detected even when the BLB algorithm was used.
The resulting Load Manager can prevent overload conditions and group flows
of the two major attacks of interest: DDoS attacks and port scans. We consider
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the Load Manager as an improvement over the Load Balancer because of its better
security. The only advantage that the Load Balancer has over the Load Manager
is that the Load Balancer can keep the loads of the NIDPSs more balanced.
In this chapter, we present the Correlation-based Load Manager – our second
solution to the traffic distribution problem. Unlike the Load Balancer’s objective,
the objective of the Load Manager is to group flows having the same dst-ip, src-ip,
and dst-port together while preventing overload conditions.
As briefly introduced in Section 1.4, our Load Manager delivers the following
features:
1. Identical Correlation Preservation: Flows having the same dst-ip, src-ip, and
dst-port are guaranteed to be sent to the same NIDPS. In other words, the
Load Manager preserves the identical correlations given by addresses and port
numbers. This maintains the anomaly-based detection accuracy of DDoS
attacks a port scans.
For example, using the Load Manager, all flows of a DDoS attack targeting a
victim are guaranteed to be sent to the same NIDPS. Therefore, if the NIDPS
is capable of detecting the attack in the first place, then the attack is detected.
We note that the grouping of flows is achieved at the cost of duplicating
traffic; however, unlike the approach proposed by Kruegel et al. [18], which
was discussed in Section 2.1, the amount of duplication generated by our Load
Manager is bounded.
Moreover, our Load Manager preserves flows. In other words, packets be-
longing to the same flow are sent to the same NIDPS. Thus, it fully supports
flow-based analysis.
2. Dynamic Load Distribution: The Load Manager considers the current NIDPSs’
loads while distributing traffic. In particular, the majority of the new traffic
is assigned to the NIDPS with the lowest load. This reduces the chance of
overloading any NIDPS when the loads of the other NIDPSs are low. Further-
more, the Load Manager provides a mechanism to optimally move flows from
one NIDPS to another when needed. The moving helps to prevent overload
conditions.
3. Customizable Correlation: Besides the default correlations which we initially
support, the Load Manager allows the addition of custom correlations. This
feature extends the capability of the Load Manager to guarantee the grouping
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of various flows of interest. As a result, advanced detection techniques, which
require the grouping of diverse flows, can be used.
We have implemented a prototype Load Manager. We evaluated both the per-
formance and the security of the Load Manager using simulation. The evaluation
results show that the Load Manager has a low overhead in terms of the delays it
introduces to packets. Moreover, it causes traffic duplication noticeably less than
the established upper bound. Most importantly, the results show that the Load
Manager successfully assigns attack-correlated flows of a variety of DDoS attacks
and port scans to the same NIDPS, thereby maintaining successful detection of the
attacks.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, we describe the
overall architecture of the Load Manager. Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 discuss the
design of the two main components of the Load Manager: the Flow Distributor and
the Flow Manager. In Section 4.5, we describe our implementation of the system.
Evaluation results are presented in Section 4.6. Finally, we conclude this chapter
in Section 4.7.
4.2 Overall Architecture
Figure 4.1 details the overall architecture of the Load Manager. The Load Manager
has two main components: the Flow Distributor and the Flow Manager.
The Flow Distributor’s first task is to distribute packets of previously assigned
flows to the corresponding NIDPSs. Its second task is to distribute new flows to the
NIDPSs based on both the current loads of the NIDPSs and the traffic correlation.
The new-flow distribution is done in such a way that identical correlations are
preserved. When there is an overloaded NIDPS, the Flow Manager’s task is to
optimally select a set of flows from this NIDPS to move to the lowest load NIDPS.
How these two components work is briefly described below.
When a new packet arrives, the Flow Distributor checks to see if this packet
belongs to a previously assigned flow. If it does then the packet is sent to the
corresponding NIDPS(s). Otherwise, the Flow Distributor checks the correlations
between the new flow, which starts with this packet, and the NIDPSs. Afterward,
the packet is duplicated to be sent to all the NIDPSs that the flow is correlated
with.
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Figure 4.1: Correlation-Based Load Manager Architecture
The Flow Distributor must be in operation all the time; meanwhile, the Flow
Manager only operates when an NIDPS becomes overloaded. When so, the Flow
Manager selects from this NIDPS a set of flows sufficient to reduce the load below
the predefined load value and with the minimum correlation with the rest of the
flows in the NIDPS to move to the lowest load NIDPS. By moving flows, the
Flow Manager prevents overload conditions. We also note that there are several
alternative ways that could be used to choose the NIDPSs that receive the moving
flows. For example, as discussed in Section 2.4, a low load threshold can be used
to determine the eligible NIDPSs to receive the moving flows. Then, the moving
flows can be distributed evenly to them, rather than distributed only to the lowest
load NIDPS.
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Table 4.1: Intrusions whose detections require the analysis of correlated flows
ID Name Description
1 DoS Machine Denial of service (DoS) attack to a target machine
2 DDoS Machine Distributed DoS attack to a target machine
3 DoS Application DoS attack to a target service
4 DDoS Application Distributed DoS attack to a target service
5 Scan Horizontal, vertical, and mixed scans
6 Distributed Scan Distributed horizontal, vertical, and mixed scans
4.3 Flow Distributor
In this section, we present the design of the Flow Distributor. First, we differentiate
intrusions whose detection requires the analysis of correlated flows from the ones
whose detection only requires the analysis of individual flows. We then discuss our
representation of NIDPS load. Afterward, we describe the Bloom filter – the data
structure that we utilize to make distribution decisions. Finally, we present our
Correlation-Based Flow Distribution algorithm, which is used to distribute packets
of previously assigned flows as well as new flows.
4.3.1 Applicable Intrusions
There are intrusions, such as viruses and worms, whose detection relies on analyzing
individual flows. As such, the detection of these intrusions is not affected by any
flow-based traffic distribution, which distributes packets belonging to the same
flow to the same NIDPS. Therefore, this type of intrusion is not the target of our
research. Instead, we focus on intrusions whose detection requires the analysis of
correlated flows.
Table 4.1 lists the most common intrusions whose detection requires the analysis
of correlated flows. We do not claim that this is a comprehensive list. In fact, one
can add additional intrusions to this table; however, the intrusions in this list are
very well-known in the research literature [15, 21, 27, 35, 40]; therefore, we consider
it a reasonable start. We note that the classification of the intrusions was adopted




Although this topic is briefly discussed in Section 3.3, we visit it again because it is
important to the design of the Load Manager, and because we gain an additional
advantage with our choice of NIDPS load representation.
As there are numerous hardware and software resources an NIDPS might have,
for example, CPU, disk, memory, and open files, representing an NIDPS load is a
nontrivial task. For the purpose of our study, load of each NIDPS is represented
as the amount of traffic it handles per second. In particular, bits per second is
used to represent the NIDPS load. For example, an NIDPS load could be 40
Mbps. Although one might argue about our choice of load representation, this
representation is the most common solution to the load representation problem in
the context of network intrusion detection and prevention [2, 35, 43].
It is worth noting that packets per second would be a more accurate load mea-
sure for the NIDPSs than bits per sec if the Load Manager worked with NIDPSs
which only do anomaly-based detection based on the packet headers. When de-
signing the Load Manager, however, we want to have it work with general NIDPSs,
which do both signature-based and anomaly-based detection. In fact, the Load
Manager preserves flows to fully support signature-based detection. Because our
target is general NIDPSs, which spend 80–90% of their time analyzing packet pay-
load, we choose bits per second as a load measure for the NIDPSs.
An advantage that we gain by representing NIDPS load in this way is the direct
relation between the NIDPS load and the flow load. In particular, we can easily
determine the percentage contributed by a flow to the load of an NIDPS. This is
because a flow load is naturally represented in terms of its traffic rate. This enables
the Flow Manager to select appropriate flows to move when an NIDPS becomes
overloaded.
Lastly, to estimate load of an NIDPS, we take periodic samples of the raw traffic
going to that NIDPS. Then, we apply the standard Single Exponential Moving
Average method [30] on the samples to estimate the load. This linear aggregation
method helps us to alleviate the negative effect of traffic spikes in our estimation. In
fact, it has been shown to perform very well in the context of NIDS load balancing
[2], as discussed in Section 2.4.
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4.3.3 Bloom Filters
In order to determine if a packet belongs to a previously assigned flow, and more
importantly, to determine the correlations between a new flow and the NIDPSs, we
use Bloom filters.
Background
A Bloom filter, originally introduced by Bloom [4], is a space-efficient probabilistic
data structure that is used to test whether a set contains a certain element. In the
context of this study, it is used to test whether an NIDPS has a certain flow, and
whether an NIDPS monitors a certain src-ip, a certain dst-ip, or a certain dst-port.
In short, a Bloom filter is an array of m bits and has k different hash functions.
Each of these functions maps an element to one of the m bits. Adding an element
involves hashing it using these functions and setting all the mapped bits to 1.
Likewise, querying an element involves checking if all the mapped bits are 1. If
one of the bits is 0 then the element is not in the set. The followings are two
fundamental properties of a Bloom filter:
1. False positives are possible, but false negatives are not.
2. Elements can be added to the set but not removed.
The primary reason why we use Bloom filters in our design is their space and
time advantages. A Bloom filter has a significant space advantage over other data
structures, such as hash tables, linked lists, and arrays. While these data structures
require storing the elements themselves, a Bloom filter with a low error rate (about
1%) requires storing only several bits per element, independent of the element size.
As a result, a Bloom filter of several KB can handle thousands of flows with low
error rate. Furthermore, adding and querying an element takes a constant time
O(k), regardless of the number of elements the set already has. This, therefore,
supports the real-time requirement of adding and querying flows.
Utilizing Bloom Filters
In order to assign packets in a way that preserve flows and correlation information,
we construct two types of Bloom filter: the Flow Bloom (FB) filters and the Cor-
relation Bloom (CB) filters. The FB filters help to preserve flows, while the CB
filters help to preserve the correlation information.
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Table 4.2: Correlation Bloom filters
ID Name Description
1 dst-ip CB filter Bloom filter containing a set of dst-ip’s
2 dst-port CB filter Bloom filter containing a set of dst-port ’s
3 src-ip CB filter Bloom filter containing a set of src-ip’s
First, each NIDPS has one FB filter. Whenever a new flow is assigned to an
NIDPS, this NIDPS’s FB filter is updated by adding the flow. At a later time, if
a packet of this flow arrives, the Flow Distributor checks the FB filters of all the
NIDPSs to determine which NIDPSs contain the flow. Then the packet is sent to
the corresponding NIDPSs.
Secondly, for each NIDPS, three CB filters are constructed. These three filters
contain sets of dst-ip’s, dst-port ’s, and src-ip’s that the NIDPS is monitoring. These
filters are termed “dst-ip CB filter”, “dst-port CB filter”, and “src-ip CB filter”
respectively and are listed in Table 4.2.
When a new flow comes, if this new flow’s src-ip, dst-ip, or dst-port belongs to
one of the three corresponding CB filters of an NIDPS, then this flow is said to
be correlated with this NIDPS and is sent to this NIDPS. The source of the traffic
duplication comes from the scenarios when a flow is correlated to multiple NIDPSs.
In these scenarios, the flow is sent to all of the NIDPSs that it is correlated with.
We note that only CB filters for dst-ip, dst-port, and src-port are constructed
because these sufficiently support the grouping of flows of the default intrusions
listed in Table 4.1. Nevertheless, additional CB filters might be added for the
purposes of detecting other attacks and advanced detection techniques. We discuss
this in detail in Section 4.3.5.
4.3.4 Correlation-Based Flow Distribution Algorithm
Here, we describe the Correlation-Based Flow Distribution (CFD) algorithm.
First, we note that the CFD algorithm is flow-based, which means it sends all
packets belonging to the same flow to the same NIDPS. Secondly, the CFD preserves
the correlation information, which means no correlation information is lost during
the distribution. Finally, the CFD makes extensive use of the FB and CB filters to
distribute the traffic appropriately. The essence of this algorithm lies in the querying
and updating of the filters. We provide the pseudocode of the CFD algorithm in
Algorithm 3, and we describe it below.
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Algorithm 3 Correlation-BasedFlowDistribution(p)
1: determine if p belongs to a previously assigned flow by checking the FB filters
2: if p belongs to a previously assigned flow then
3: distribute p to the NIDPSs that the flow was assigned to
4: return
5: end if
6: determine the correlated NIDPSs of flow f of p by checking the CB filters
7: if f is correlated with some NIDPSs then
8: distribute f to those NIDPSs
9: update FB filters of those NIDPSs to contain f
10: update CB filters of the correlated NIDPS with the lowest load to contain
new fields of f
11: else if f is not correlated with any NIDPS then
12: distribute f to the lowest load NIDPS
13: update FB filter of this NIDPS to contain f
14: update CB filters of this NIDPS to contain new fields of f
15: end if
16: return
When a packet comes, it could belong to an existing flow, which was assigned
to an NIDPS, or it could be the first packet of a new flow. To determine this,
the packet is checked against the FB filters (Line 1). If it belongs to a previously
assigned flow, the FB filters also tell which NIDPSs that the flow was assigned to.
The packet is then sent to those NIDPSs (Line 2–5). This case does not involve
updating the FB and CB filters.
On the other hand, if the packet is the first packet of a new flow, then we
examine the correlations that this flow has with all the NIDPSs. These correlations
are identified by checking the CB filters (Line 6). If this new flow is correlated
with some NIDPSs then it will be sent to those NIDPSs. Furthermore, the FB
filters of those NIDPSs will be updated by adding this flow. In addition, if this flow
introduces any new dst-ip, dst-port, and src-ip values, these values will be added
to the corresponding CB filters of the correlated NIDPS with the lowest load (Line
7–10).
In the other case, if this new flow is not correlated with any of the NIDPSs,
then it is assigned to the NIDPS with the lowest load. The FB filter of this NIDPS
is updated by adding the flow, and the CB filters of this NIDPS are updated by
adding the fields of the flow (Line 11–15).
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We note that the CFD algorithm always takes into account the current loads of
the NIDPSs while adding a new flow to an FB filter or a new field to a CB filter. In
particular, it always adds a new flow or a new field to the FB filter or the CB filter
of the NIDPS with the lowest load. This minimizes the probability of overloading
any already heavily loaded NIDPS.
4.3.5 Customizable Correlation
By default, our Flow Distributor preserves the identical correlations given by
dst-ip, dst-port, and src-ip. In particular, flows having the same value of any one of
these fields are guaranteed to be sent to the same NIDPS. Furthermore, our Flow
Distributor can support additional correlations by adding appropriate CB filters.
We next describe how the Flow Distributor supports a new correlation.
Let δ be the new correlation that we want to support. That is if flows have
the correlation δ then they must be sent to the same NIDPS. For example, δ could
specify a group of various dst-ip’s, so that flows having dst-ip’s belonging to this
group will be sent to the same NIDPS. We construct a CB filter for δ by adding the
appropriate field values to an empty Bloom filter. For instance, adding the above
dst-ip’s to a new Bloom filter. Let ∆ be the CB filter of δ.
Following, we adjust the CFD algorithm to accommodate the new CB filter ∆.
The new algorithm is termed ∆-CFD and is detailed in Algorithm 4. The changes
made to the original CFD algorithm to produce this algorithm are as follows: At
the beginning, ∆ is not assigned to any particular NIDPS. When a new flow f
comes, right before checking for the default CB filters, we check if f belongs to
∆. If so then we assign the CB filter ∆ to the current lowest load NIDPS, and we
distribute f to this NIDPS (Line 8–10). After the assignment of ∆, future flows
which belong to ∆ will be sent to the NIDPS which owns ∆ (Line 11–12).
In the case there are multiple ∆’s, i.e. when there are multiple custom correla-
tions, the ∆’s would be assigned to the NIDPSs similarly: each of the ∆’s will be
assigned to the lowest load NIDPS when its first matching flow arrives. After that,
when a new flow comes, the already assigned ∆’s have to be checked before the CB
filters are checked.
By supporting additional correlations, the Flow Distributor allows for the group-
ing of diverse flows, which enables advanced detection techniques, such as detecting
port scans by analyzing connection attempts to the unused address space and de-
tecting various attacks derived from known attack graphs.
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Algorithm 4 ∆-Correlation-BasedFlowDistribution(p)
1: determine if p belongs to a previously assigned flow by checking the FB filters
2: if p belongs to a previously assigned flow then
3: distribute p to the NIDPSs that the flow was assigned to
4: return
5: end if
6: determine if flow f of p belongs to ∆
7: if f belongs to ∆ then
8: if ∆ was not assigned then
9: assign ∆ to the NIDPS with the lowest load
10: distribute f to this NIDPS
11: else
12: distribute f to the NIDPS that owns ∆
13: end if
14: end if
15: determine the correlated NIDPSs of f by checking the CB filters
16: if f is correlated with some NIDPSs then
17: distribute f to those NIDPSs
18: update FB filters of those NIDPSs to contain f
19: update CB filters of the correlated NIDPS with the lowest load to contain
new fields of f
20: else if f is not correlated with any NIDPS then
21: distribute f to the lowest load NIDPS
22: update FB filter of this NIDPS to contain f




4.3.6 Duplication Upper Bound
Here, we show that the amount of packet duplication created by the Flow Distrib-
utor is bounded. This duplication is needed to send flows having the same dst-ip,
src-ip, or dst-port to the same NIDPS.
Lemma 1. Assuming that the Bloom filters have 0% error rate, the maximum
amount of packet duplication introduced by the Flow Distributor is 200%.
Proof.
Let f be a new flow. First, when f arrives, if it is correlated with multiple
NIDPSs then it is duplicated to be assigned to all of them. As a result, the amount
of duplication is dependent on the number of correlated NIDPSs.
Secondly, because each new value dst-ip, dst-port, or src-ip of any previous
flow is only added once to the corresponding CB filters of an NIDPS by the CFD
algorithm, the CB filters of the NIDPSs are mutually exclusive. In other words,
given a value of dst-ip, dst-port, or src-ip, it cannot belong to more than 1 CB filter.
As a result, each of the dst-ip, dst-port, and src-ip of f can belong to a maximum
of 1 CB filter. Thus, f could be correlated with a maximum of 3 CB filters.
Finally, given any 3 CB filters, they can belong to a maximum of 3 NIDPSs (each
NIDPS owns 1 CB filter). Hence f is correlated with a maximum of 3 NIDPSs.
In this case, 2 additional copies of f are produced to be sent to the 2 additional
NIDPSs. Thus, the maximum amount of packet duplication is 200%.
As discussed in Section 4.3.3, Bloom filters have false positives, which may
introduce additional amount of packet duplication; however, if the Bloom filters
are constructed with reasonable sizes – a Bloom filter with 1% error rate requires
only several bits per element that it stores – their error rates will be small. Thus,
the amount of packet duplication due to Bloom filters’ errors is negligible.
It must also be noted that the duplication upper bound does not apply when
the Flow Distributor implements additional correlations. This is because in order
to support the additional correlations, the Flow Distributor has to duplicate more
traffic.
4.4 Flow Manager
In this section, we present the design of our Flow Manager. When an NIDPS
becomes overloaded, i.e., its load is higher than a predefined threshold Tload, the
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Flow Manager selects from this NIDPS an optimal set of flows, which has the least
cost and a satisfactory benefit, to move to the lowest load NIDPS. We first describe
the need to move flows, its expense, and our approach to it. Then, we describe the
cost and the benefit of moving flows. We then formalize the problem of selecting
flows to move as an optimization problem, as well as provide an approximation to
it. Finally, we present the Correlation-Based Flow Moving algorithm, which is the
heart of the Flow Manager.
4.4.1 Moving Flows
Why Moving Flows?
Although the Flow Distributor usually distributes flows to the NIDPSs with the
lowest load, there remains the risk of an NIDPS becoming overloaded due to the
burstiness of network traffic. When an NIDPS is overloaded, it drops packets.
As a result, intrusions whose packets are dropped might slip through the NIDPS
undetected. This seriously compromises the security provided by the cluster. We
argue that although moving flows involves the loss of some detection states – as we
discuss subsequently – it is still more desirable than random packet drops.
In fact, the idea of dynamically moving flows has been included in several recent
approaches [2, 35]. In their approaches, there is usually a threshold and when the
load of an NIDPS reaches that threshold, some of the flows going to that NIDPS are
moved to other NIDPSs. We have adopted the threshold-based approach; however,
we consider moving flows as our last resort to guard against overload conditions,
not the main method for providing load balancing, in contrast to the work of others
[2, 35].
The Expense of Moving Flows
The primary expense of moving flows is the loss of detection states. Since modern
NIDPSs, such as Snort [34], Bro [31], and Cisco IPS [7], are stateful, they keep
track of the states of the connections to accurately detect and prevent intrusions.
Moving flows, however, renders the states at both the source and the target NIDPSs
incomplete. This affects the detection accuracy for intrusions whose effects can be
seen only by monitoring the moving flows.
We note that the loss of detection states when moving flows is very difficult to
avoid. In particular, in order to preserve these detection states, additional complex
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hardware and software are required. We discuss one possible way to preserve these
detection states in Section 5.2. Nevertheless, the loss of detection states caused by
moving flows is still preferable to random packet drops. This is because random
packet drops, in the worst case, might cause the loss of all detection states of the
overloaded NIDPS.
Another notable expense when moving flows is the loss of correlation informa-
tion. Since the correlations among flows in an NIDPS plays an important role in
the anomaly-based detection of the NIDPS, this loss of correlation might decrease
detection accuracy. For instance, if some early attack flows of an intrusion are
moved in the middle of the intrusion, then the NIDPS will lose the correlations
between those flows and the later attack flows. As a result, this intrusion might
avoid the NIDPS’s detection. Unfortunately, this expense was overlooked by the
approaches taken by others [2, 35].
Our Approach
Our objective is to develop a flow moving mechanism that provides a desired re-
duction of load of the overloaded NIDPS, while minimizing the loss of correlation
information. Before going into detail in subsequent sections, we briefly describe our
approach here.
When there is an NIDPS whose load is over a predefined threshold, the Load
Manager activates. It first collects the active flows of the overloaded NIDPS. These
flows serve as the candidates for the move. It then executes an algorithm, which
we describe subsequently, to select a set of flows to move. This set of flows has the
desired amount of load and the minimal amount of correlation with the other flows
in the NIDPS.
Finally, we note that the process of moving flows is computationally expensive
since it involves collecting active flows, executing an algorithm, and so on. As a
result, in order to ensure the Load Manager’s real-time assignment of packets, this
process must be run as a separate thread or process, utilizing a different core or
processor. The purpose of this is to ensure that the Flow Manager does not interfere
with the Flow Distributor except when updating the Bloom filters.
4.4.2 Cost – Correlations among Flows
Within the same NIDPS, a flow has a certain degree of correlation with other flows.
This correlation is translated directly into a cost when the flow is moved to another
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Table 4.3: Correlations and the intrusions that they entail









NIDPS. Intuitively, if a flow has a very little correlation with other flows within the
same NIDPS, then moving this flow away costs very little and vice versa. Therefore,
in order to determine the cost of moving a flow, we fundamentally have to identify
the degree of correlation it has with other flows.
We construct a correlation table, Table 4.3, based on the intrusions listed in
Table 4.1 and the information given by the flow tuples. Table 4.3 lists all the
correlations given by the 3-tuples: dst-ip, dst-port, and src-ip; and the intrusions
each correlation entails. For example, if two flows have the same dst-ip, then they
might belong to a DoS machine (1), a DDoS machine (2), a vertical scan (5), or
a distributed vertical scan (6). Therefore, separating flows having the same dst-
ip would negatively affect the detection accuracy of these intrusions.
We next describe how a cost for moving each flow in an NIDPS is calculated. At
a particular point in time, for each flow in the NIDPS, we identify its correlations
with every other flow in the same NIDPS. We note that if two flows have the
same dst-ip and dst-port, then their correlation is {dst-ip,dst-port} but not {dst-ip}
or {dst-port} alone and so on. Afterward, for each correlation, a score is given
depending on the intrusions that the correlation entails, which is based on Table
4.3. Lastly, we total the scores to get the cost.
For example, Table 4.4 illustrates how the cost of moving a flow f1 in an NI-
DPS having four flows f1, f2, f3, and f4 is calculated. Regarding the scoring, for
simplicity, we give every intrusion a weight of one, so all intrusions have the same
weight. One could give different weights to different intrusions, depending on their
severities. For instance, if one gives intrusion 1 weight 2 and other intrusions weight
1, then the corresponding scores are 5, 4, and 6 instead of 4, 3, and 5. Thus, the
cost is 15 instead of 12.
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Table 4.4: Calculation of the cost of moving flow f1 in an NIDPS having four flows
f1, f2, f3, and f4
Flows Correlation Intrusions Entailed Score
f1 and f2 {dst-ip} 1,2,5,6 4
f1 and f3 {src-ip} 1,3,5 3
f1 and f4 {dst-ip,src-ip} 1,2,3,5,6 5
Cost 12







In this equation, ci is the cost of moving flow i, n is the number of flows in the
NIDPS, m is the number of intrusions, wk is the weight of intrusion k, and ai,j,k
equals 1 if the correlation between flow i and flow j entails the intrusion k and 0
otherwise.
In summary, the cost of moving a flow in an NIDPS is a direct translation of
how much it correlates with other flows in the same NIDPS. Our calculation of cost
is tightly connected with the frequently experienced intrusions, whose detection
requires analysis of correlated flows. Lastly, administrators could customize the list
of intrusions, as well as the weight of each intrusion, to achieve the most suitable
cost calculation for their domains.
4.4.3 Benefit – Reduced Load
While the cost of moving previously assigned flows from one NIDPS to another is
the loss of correlation information, the benefit of it is the reduced load of the former
NIDPS. This amount of load is discussed here.
First, given a set of flows, we need to be able to calculate its load in order to
determine the benefit of moving it. The load of a flow set equals the sum of the
load of its flows and the load of each flow is estimated similarly to the NIDPS load,
as discussed in Section 4.3.2.
Secondly, suitable values of the benefit (reduced load) should be specified de-
pending on the overall system load and the burstiness of the traffic. When the
overall system load is high, the load of every NIDPS in the system may be high.
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In this case, giving the benefit a low value is preferable since there is little room to
move the load around. In fact, if the benefit value is set high, then a substantial
amount of load may be moved from the overloaded NIDPS to another NIDPS. In
this case, the latter NIDPS is very likely to become overloaded since its load is
already high. On the contrary, when the overall system load is low, a high value of
benefit becomes more viable as there is more room to move the load; however, there
is a high cost associated with the high benefit value since more flows are moved.
With regard to the burstiness of the traffic, it is preferable to give the benefit
a high value if the traffic is bursty. This would give the overloading NIDPS more
room to deal with the traffic spikes. Otherwise, a smaller benefit value is better
suited for more uniform traffic.
Finally, if the benefit value is too low, the overloading NIDPS would be more
likely to become overloaded again in a short time. This is because only a small
amount of load is relocated. Since moving flows is costly in terms of computation,
this setting should be avoided.
4.4.4 Optimal Flow Selection Problem
The optimal flow selection problem (OFSP) is to find in an NIDPS a set of flows,
which has the minimum cost of moving, i.e., the least amount of correlation with
the other flows, and has a total benefit higher than or equal to a specified benefit
value.
Let n be the number of flows the NIDPS has. For each flow i, denote its benefit
bi and its cost ci. Let B be the predefined benefit value. Then, the OFSP can be








xi bi ≥ B ,
xi = 0 or 1 , i = 1, · · · , n ,
where xi is a binary integer: xi = 1 if flow i is selected, and xi = 0 otherwise. The
OFSP can be solved by simply converting it to a standard 0-1 Knapsack problem
(KP) through the change of variable:
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yi = 1− xi, i ∈ [1, n] .













yi = 0 or 1 , i = 1, · · · , n .
Here ci and bi could be thought of as value and weight of item i correspondingly.
Also, the capacity of the knapsack is
∑n
i=1 bi−B. Once the yi’s are solved, finding
xi’s, the solution to the OFSP, is straightforward.
4.4.5 Heuristic Flow Selection Algorithm
Solving OFSP primarily involves solving the standard KP. The KP is a very well-
known NP-hard problem, which cannot be solved in polynomial time. For the
purpose of this study, because of the real-time requirement of the flow selection, we
choose the popular greedy algorithm described by Martello and Toth [25] to find
the y’s. Afterward, we derive the x’s from the y’s. The details of our approximation
– the Heuristic Flow Selection algorithm – can be found in Appendix A.
It is worth noting that because the KP has been studied extensively in the
combinatorial optimization research community, there are other algorithms to find
better approximate solutions, as well as the optimal solution [25]. However, these
algorithms usually require more computational time. Nevertheless, there is room
for further improvement.
4.4.6 Correlation-Based Flow Moving Algorithm
After the flows are selected, in order to complete the move, Bloom filters of the
source NIDPS and the target NIDPS have to be updated. In particular, the FB
and CB filters of the source NIDPS have to be reconstructed to exclude the selected
flows and their fields since Bloom filters do not support removals. Meanwhile, for
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Algorithm 5 Correlation-BasedFlowMoving(S,B)
Require: An NIDPS S, a predefined benefit B
1: build the set of active flows Factive of S
2: Fmove = HeuristicFlowSelection(B,Factive)
3: T = NIDPS with the lowest load
4: Reconstruct FB filter of S to exclude flows in Fmove
5: Reconstruct CB filters of S to include only fields which are in both the original
filters and the remaining flows
6: Update FB filter of T to include flows in Fmove
7: Update CB filter of T to include fields in the flows being moved
8: return
the target NIDPS, its FB filter is updated by adding the selected flows, and its CB
filters are updated by adding the fields which are removed from the source NIDPS’s
CB filters. The complete Flow Manager’s moving algorithm – Correlation-Based
Flow Moving (CFM) algorithm - is presented in Algorithm 5.
4.5 Implementation
We have implemented a prototype Load Manager using the libpcap [22]. Besides our
CFD algorithm, for the purpose of comparison, the Load Manager also has a hash-
based distribution algorithm. In particular, we implemented a simple additive hash:
(src-ip + dst-ip + src-port + dst-port) mod n, where n is the number of NIDPSs.
Bloom filters are constructed to be capable of handling up to 1 million elements
(q = 106) with a low error rate at 1%. Specifically, each Bloom filter is of size
p = 107 (bit) – about 1.2 MB – and has the optimal number of hash functions:
k = 0.7p
q
= 7. The optimal value k is as presented in the work of Putze et al.
[33]. We construct the 7 hash functions based on an efficient and effective method
introduced by Kirsch and Mitzenmacher [17]. In particular, the 7 hash functions
are constructed as follows:
gi = (h1 + i h2) mod p , i = 1 · · · 7 ,
where h1 = (src-ip + src-port + dst-ip + dst-port) mod p ,
and h2 = (src-ip + src-port− dst-ip− dst-port) mod p .
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For each NIDPS, we take a sample of the traffic going to it every 1 second to
estimate its load. For the Single Exponential Moving Average [30], the number of
samples for the initial calculation is s = 30. In other words, the first estimated load
is the mean of 5 initial samples of load. Also, the smoothing factor is α = 2
s+1
. The
smoothing factor is essentially the weight of the current load in the estimation:
estimated load = α · current load + (1− α) · last load .
Flow load is estimated similarly but with s = 5.
Intrusions listed in Table 4.1 are initially supported and they all have weight 1
in the implementation. We also note that the Flow Manager is implemented to run
as a separate thread beside the Flow Distributor. This thread only interferes with
the distribution process when it updates the filters. We have done this to ensure
real-time traffic distribution.
Finally, for the simulations, the prototype Load Manager is run on a system
having a 2.0 GHz Intel Duo Core CPU, 2 GB RAM, and 2× 1 Gbps NICs; and it
is used to distribute traffic to 8 NIDPSs.
4.6 Evaluation
4.6.1 Performance
In order to evaluate the performance of the Load Manager, we used the same trace
file that was previously used to evaluate the performance of the Load Balancer in
Section 3.7. In particular, this is an hour trace captured from 12:00 to 13:00 on
Tuesday, December 2nd, 2003, by NLANR. This hour was one of the busiest hours
of the network. During this hour, there were 200 new flows per second and 14 Mbps
traffic on average [37].
We also note that in the two performance evaluations conducted, which eval-
uated the system overhead and the packet duplication amount, there was no flow
movement. The NIDPSs’ capacity was set high enough so that no flow movement
was needed.
System Overhead
We conducted the first simulation to evaluate the system overhead in terms of
delays that the Load Manager introduces to the packets. In this simulation, the
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Figure 4.2: System Overhead – Packet Assignment Time
Load Manager used the trace file as its input. It read the packets off the trace file
and distributed them using the CFD algorithm. We recorded the time required to
run the CFD algorithm for all the packets. The recorded time was the difference
between the two timestamps, one before and one after the execution of the CFD
algorithm. The timestamps were taken using the Java function System.nanoTime().
We also note that the packets were not actually sent to the NIDPSs since it was
not necessary.
Recall that when a new packet arrives, we check the FB and CB filters to assign
the packet correspondingly. In addition, in some scenarios, FB and CB filters need
to be updated. The overhead associated with each packet is the time required to
query and update the filters. More specifically, it is the time required to calculate
the different hash functions of the Bloom filters for querying and updating them.
Figure 4.2 plots the delays that the Load Manager introduces to a sampling
of 1000 consecutive packets. It can be observed from this graph that there are 3
distinct classes of delays. The lowest class has about 10 microseconds (µs) delay,
the middle class has about 20 µs delay, and the highest class has above 20 µs delay.
By analyzing the CFD algorithm, we learned that these classes corresponded to the
following three different scenarios:
1. The new packet belongs to some previously assigned flows: In this scenario, the
Load Manager introduces the lowest amount of delay to the packet because
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only the FB filters of the NIDPSs are queried and there is no update.
2. The new packet starts a new flow but is not correlated with an NIDPS: In this
scenario, additional CB filters are queried, and the FB and CB filters of the
NIDPS with the lowest load are updated.
3. The new packet starts a new flow and is correlated with some NIDPSs: In this
scenario, additional CB filters are queried, FB filters of all correlated NIDPSs
and CB filters of the correlated NIDPS with the lowest load are updated.
Overall, the delays introduced to the packets by the Load Manager are very
low since they are on the order of µs. In fact, the average delay per packet for the
whole trace is 17 µs (not shown on the graph). As a result, we conclude that the
Load Manager has a very low overhead in terms of the delays introduced to the
packets. With our prototype implementation and our hardware, the Load Manager
can provide real-time traffic distribution to 8 NIDPSs for up to 500 Mbps traffic.
Duplication Amount
As discussed previously, the preservation of correlation is achieved at the cost of
duplicating traffic. Although we proved in Section 4.3.6 that the amount of packet
duplication is bounded by 200% – assuming that Bloom filters have no errors and
that there are no additional correlations – it is valuable to learn what this amount
could be in practice. Here, we conduct a simulation to measure the amount of
packet duplication introduced by the Load Manager over time.
Similar to the previous simulation, in this simulation, the Load Manager read
packets off the trace file then assigned them using the CFD algorithm. We measured
both the number of packets taken in, Pin (packet), and the number of packets sent
out, Pout (packet), by the Load Manager. Then, we used them to calculate the





Figure 4.3 plots the packet duplication amount reported at every 5-minute inter-
val of the simulation. It can be observed from the graph that the packet duplication
amount for this trace changes gently over time and has value about 115%. This
amount of packet duplication, however, is a lot less than the upper bound 200%.
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Figure 4.3: Duplication Amount over Time
We note that the amount of packet duplication might vary from trace to trace.
In particular, it depends on the diversity of the traffic as well as the rate of the new
connections; however, the result of this simulation gives us a valuable observation of
what the amount of packet duplication could be in practice. In this particular case,
the amount of packet duplication is significantly less than the established packet
duplication upper bound and is about 115%.
The packet duplication is the cost of grouping flows having the same dst-ip,
src-ip, or dst-port together. This cost, however, can be compensated by adding
additional NIDPSs to a cluster because the amount of duplication does not depend
on the number of NIDPSs. In particular, the more NIDPSs a cluster has, the more
tolerable the duplication because the additional load caused by the duplication is
distributed to more NIDPSs.
4.6.2 Security
In order to evaluate the security of the Load Manager, we conducted a variety of
simulations. These simulations involved both background traffic and attack traffic.
Here, we first describe the network model and the background traffic used in the
simulations. We then present the evaluation results related to various DoS attacks
and port scans.
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Network Model and Background Traffic
The internal network that we simulated was a Class B network, and 10% of the
address space was occupied. Thus, the protected internal network had about 6500
active IP addresses.
Variable background traffic was generated as follows: Source and destination
addresses were randomly generated such that 65% of the flows were going to or
coming from 10% of the occupied IP addresses of the internal network; the flows
are randomly generated such that 80% of the load came from 20% of the flows;
the traffic rate was about 100 Mbps; there were about 100 new flows per second;
packets had sizes uniformly distributed from 500 to 1500 bytes; and flows’ durations
were uniformly distributed from 1 to 30 seconds.
DDoS Attacks
We carried out 9 simulations to evaluate how the Load Manager supports the
grouping of attack flows for 9 different (D)DoS attacks. The generated attacks
were all UDP flood attacks, which involved a number of attackers sending large
numbers of UDP packets to random ports on a single victim. Nonetheless, the
attacks varied in the number of machines used for the attacks, the attack duration,
and the rate of the attack traffic. Meanwhile, we used the same background traffic
described above for all 9 simulations. For each simulation, both the CFD algorithm
and the hash-based algorithm were used, and we recorded the assignment of the
attack packets. We also note that in these simulations, the NIDPSs’ capacity was
set high enough so that there was no flow movement.
Table 4.5 lists the generated (D)DoS attacks and the NIDPSs which received
100% of the attack packets when the CFD algorithm was used. The results of the
simulations showed that for each of the attacks, when the CFD algorithm was used,
there was always at least one NIDPS which received all the attack packets.
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 detail the distribution of the attack packets of two
of the 9 generated (D)DoS attacks when both of the algorithms were used. The
plotted attacks are 2 and 8. It can be observed from the graphs that when the
hash-based algorithm was used, the attack packets were fairly evenly distributed to
all of the NIDPSs. Thus, there was no NIDPS which could receive all of the attack
packets.
In conclusion, the evaluation results validate that the Load Manager successfully
grouped the flows of the (D)DoS attacks together. For each of the simulated attacks,
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Table 4.5: Various simulated (D)DoS attacks
DDoS No. of No. of Duration Rate NIDPSs receiving
ID Attackers Victims (sec) (pkt/sec) 100% atk-packet
1 1 1 5 5000 1, 5
2 1 1 30 10000 1, 5
3 1 1 60 20000 1, 5
4 500 1 5 5000 1
5 500 1 30 10000 1
6 500 1 60 20000 1
7 1000 1 5 5000 1
8 1000 1 30 10000 1
9 1000 1 60 20000 1
Figure 4.4: The Distribution of Attack Packets of the DDoS 2
66
Figure 4.5: The Distribution of Packets of DDoS 8
when the CFD algorithm was used, the Load Manager guaranteed that there was
at least one NIDPS which received all packets of the attack. Thus, this NIDPS had
all the available correlation information to detect and prevent this attack.
Port Scans
We conducted 8 simulations with different port scans to evaluate how the Load
Manager supports the grouping of the scans’ flows. Similar to the DDoS evalua-
tion, we use the same background traffic in all the simulations. Furthermore, all
of the scans were TCP SYN scans. However, the scans varied in the number of
scanning hosts, the scan duration, the number of target machines, and the number
of target ports. For each simulation, both the CFD algorithm and the hash-based
algorithm were used, the target machines and the target ports were randomly se-
lected, and we recorded the assignment of every scan packet. We also note that in
these simulations, the NIDPSs’ capacity was set high enough so that there was no
flow movement.
Table 4.6 lists the 8 scans that we simulated, together with the NIDPSs which
received 100% of the scan packets when the CFD algorithm was used. The last
column of the table shows that, for each scan, there was at least one NIDPS which
received 100% of the scan packets.
Figure 4.6 further shows the distribution of the packets of scan 7 when both
the CFD algorithm and the hash-based algorithm were used. Similar to the DDoS
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Table 4.6: Various simulated port scans
Scan Number Duration Number Number NIDPSs receiving
ID of Scan (sec) of Target of Target 100% atk-packet
Hosts Machines Ports
1 1 5 1 1024 1,5
2 1 60 1 1024 1
3 100 5 1 1024 1
4 100 60 1 1024 4
5 1 5 1000 1 1
6 1 60 1000 1 1
7 100 5 1000 1 5
8 100 60 1000 1 4
Figure 4.6: The Distribution of Packets of Scan 7
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evaluation result, when the hash-based algorithm was used, the packets were scat-
tered; thus, each NIDPS only received a small number of scan packets. On the
other hand, when the CFD algorithm was used, NIDPS 5 received 100% of the
scan packets.
It is worth noting that with regard to sophisticated scans, which use many
scanning hosts to scan many ports of many victims over a long duration, the Load
Manager might not be able to group all flows of these scans together due to the
diversity of the scans’ flows. Nevertheless, these scans might be detected by moni-
toring the number of connection attempts to unused address space of the protected
networks. In this case, custom correlations might help to group flows of these
connection attempts together, thereby supporting the detection of such scans.
In summary, the results of this evaluation showed that the Load Manager suc-
cessfully grouped flows of the port scans together. For each of the simulated scans,
when the CFD algorithm was used, the Load Manager guaranteed that there was at
least one NIDPS which received 100% of the scan packets. Therefore, if this NIDPS
was capable of detecting the scan then it would detect the scan successfully.
4.6.3 Flow Movement
Effect of Flow Movement on NIDPSs’ Loads
We conducted two simulations to evaluate the effect of flow movement on loads
of the NIDPSs when the cluster is lightly loaded. In both simulations, variable
background traffic as described in Section 4.6.2 was generated. Recall that the
background traffic was about 100 Mbps. The Load Manager received the traffic
and assigned it to the NIDPSs using the CFD algorithm. Both the simulations
were run five times with different seeds for the random traffic generator. During
the simulations, we recorded the NIDPSs’ load.
In the first simulation, there was no flow movement. The NIDPSs’ capacity
was set high enough so that no flow movement was needed. In particular, both
the NIDPSs’ capacity and the Flow Manager’s activation threshold were set to 100
Mbps. In the second simulation, there were flow movements because loads of some
NIDPSs were larger than the Flow Manager’s activation threshold. Specifically, the
NIDPSs’ capacity was set to 50 Mbps and the threshold was set to 30 Mbps. With
regard to the flow movement, the benefit (reduced load) was set to 10 Mbps, and
the Flow Manager checked the NIDPSs’ loads every 10 seconds to move flows if
necessary.
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Figure 4.7: Loads of the NIDPSs over Time without Flow Movement (top) and
with Flow Movement (bottom)
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Figure 4.8: Loads of the NIDPSs over Time with Flow Movement
Figure 4.7 plots average values of loads of the NIDPSs in both simulations. We
note that the x-axis does not begin at zero but begins at time 10 seconds. During
the first 10 seconds, the system establishes an initial load. On the one hand, it
can be observed from the top graph that when there was no flow movement, the
loads of the NIDPSs were significantly unbalanced. In particular, the load of the
first NIDPS was noticeably higher than the rest. The first NIDPS could have
dropped packets due to being overloaded if the NIDPSs’ capacity had been lower
than 70 Mbps. On the other hand, it can be observed from the bottom graph that
when there were flow movements, the loads of the NIDPS were more balanced. In
particular, the loads of the NIDPSs were kept below the specified threshold of 30
Mbps.
In conclusion, flow movements help to balance NIDPSs’ load. In particular, if
overall traffic load is not high and an activation threshold is reasonably chosen then
the flow movements can help to keep the NIDPSs’ loads below this threshold.
Effect of Flow Movement on Port Scans
We conducted 8 simulations to evaluate the effect of flow movement on the detection
accuracy of port scans when overall load of the cluster was high.
In these simulations, the same background traffic as the previous evaluation was
generated. There were flow movements during the simulations. The Flow Manager’s
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activation threshold was set to 25 Mbps, which was less than the threshold used in
the previous evaluation. The reason was that we wanted flow movements to occur
more often during the simulations. With regard to the moving, the benefit (reduced
load) was set to 10 Mbps, and the Flow Manager checked the NIDPSs’ loads every
10 seconds to move flows if necessary.
Figure 4.8 plots the average values of the NIDPSs’ loads of five runs with dif-
ferent seeds for the random traffic generator. As in Figure 4.7, the x-axis begins
at time 10 seconds. It can be observed from this graph that with the activation
threshold set to 25 Mbps, flow movements occurred almost every 10 seconds. Also,
since some NIDPSs usually had loads larger than the threshold, the cluster was
considered heavily loaded.
Within this setting, we generated 8 different port scans, which were identical to
the ones presented in Section 4.6.2. The scans all started at second 60. For each
simulation, the CFD algorithm was used to distribute the traffic and we recorded
the assignment of every scan packet.
The result of this evaluation was that for each of the generated scans, there
was always at least one NIDPS which received 100% of the scan flows. This result
indicated that the flow movements did not decrease the anomaly-based detection
accuracy of port scans.
If flows had been randomly chosen to move from an overloaded NIDPS to an-
other, flows belonging to the same scan could have been distributed to different
NIDPSs, resulting in a decrease of detection accuracy. This evaluation result, how-
ever, indicated that the Flow Manager, which always selects flows having the least
amount of correlation to move, did not select flows from the same scan to move.
In summary, the above two evaluation results show that flow movement helps
to balance the loads of the NIDPSs when the cluster is lightly loaded and it does
not negatively affect the grouping of scan flows. Nonetheless, whether the flow
movement can help to balance the loads of the NIDPSs when the cluster is heavily
loaded needs further investigation. We plan to examine this in future work.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of the Load
Manager. As our second solution to the traffic distribution problem, the Load
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Manager’s first objective is to group flows having the same dst-ip, src-ip, and dst-
port together, which preserves the anomaly-based detection accuracy of DDoS at-
tacks and port scans, and its second objective is to prevent the NIDPSs from being
overloaded.
The Load Manager consists of two main components: the Flow Distributor and
the Flow Manager. The Correlation-Based Flow Distribution algorithm is used by
the Flow Distributor to intelligently distribute the traffic to the NIDPSs in a way
such that: (1) the identical correlations given by addresses and port numbers are
preserved and (2) the risk of overloading any NIDPS is reduced. On the other hand,
the Flow Manager uses the Correlation-Based Flow Moving algorithm to move flows
to prevent overload conditions of the NIDPSs. Together, the Flow Distributor
and the Flow Manager provide the key attributes of the Load Manager: identical
correlations preservation, customizable correlation, and dynamic load distribution.
We have implemented a prototype Load Manager and evaluated it using sim-
ulation. The evaluation results show that the Load Manager has low overhead in
terms of the delays introduced to the packets and that the amount of traffic dupli-
cation is significantly lower than the established upper bound. Most importantly,
the evaluation results validate that the Load Manager successfully sends flows of
a variety of DDoS attacks and port scans to the same NIDPS, thereby preserving
the anomaly-based detection accuracy of the NIDPSs.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
To address the overload conditions brought up by the increasing network traffic
volume, recent literature in the network intrusion detection and prevention field has
proposed the use of clusters of NIDPSs [2, 18, 35, 40, 43]. When using clusters of
NIDPSs, distributing the network traffic to the NIDPSs plays a very important role
in both performance and security of the clusters. In particular, on the one hand,
uneven load distribution greatly increases the chance of overloading an NIDPS
even when the loads of the other NIDPSs are low. On the other hand, since simple
traffic distributions cause high loss of correlation information, some intrusions might
slip through the NIDPSs undetected. These intrusions are those that require the
analysis of correlated flows, such as DDoS attacks and port scans.
Clusters proposed in recent research often use simple traffic distribution schemes.
Some of these schemes do not provide load balancing [18, 43, 40], which results in
a high risk of overloading the NIDPSs. More importantly, none of the previously
proposed approaches takes into account the traffic correlation in their traffic distri-
butions. As a result, the security of the cluster might be compromised because of
the substantial loss of correlation information.
In this thesis, we propose two novel systems: the Correlation-Based Load Bal-
ancer and the Correlation-Based Load Manager as two different solutions to the
NIDPS traffic distribution problem. The Load Balancer and the Load Manager
both consider the current loads of the NIDPSs when distributing traffic to provide
fine-grained load balancing and dynamic load distribution, respectively. More im-
portantly, both systems consider traffic correlation in their distributions, thereby
significantly reducing the loss of correlation information during their distribution
of traffic.
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We have implemented prototypes of both systems and evaluated them using
extensive simulations and real traffic traces. Overall, the evaluation results show
that both systems have low overhead in terms of the delays introduced to the pack-
ets. More importantly, compared to the naive hash-based distribution, the Load
Balancer significantly improves the anomaly-based detection accuracy of DDoS at-
tacks and port scans – the two major attacks that require the analysis of correlated
flows – meanwhile, the Load Manager successfully maintains the anomaly-based
detection accuracy of these two major attacks of the NIDPSs.
5.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis contributes to the network intrusion detection and prevention research
community two novel traffic distribution systems for clusters of NIDPSs:
1. The Correlation-Based Load Balancer is flow-based and delivers the fol-
lowing features:
• Fine-grained Load Balancing: The difference between loads of the NIDPSs
is kept within a specified bound.
• Anomaly-based Detection and Prevention Support: The loss of correla-
tion information is minimized, so the accuracy of the anomaly-based
detection is significantly improved.
• Configurable Security: Various configurations are available to favor secu-
rity, i.e., reduced loss of correlation information, over performance, i.e.,
load balancing.
2. The Correlation-Based Load Manager is also flow-based and offers the
following features:
• Identical Correlation Preservation: Flows having the same dst-ip, src-ip,
or dst-port are guaranteed to be sent to the same NIDPS. This maintains
the anomaly-based detection accuracy of DDoS attacks and port scans.
• Dynamic Load Distribution: The chance of overloading any NIDPS when
the loads of the other NIDPSs are low is greatly reduced. Overload
conditions are prevented.
• Customizable Correlation: Custom correlations can be added, which
supports the grouping of various flows of interest. Thus, advanced de-
tection techniques requiring the grouping of diverse flows can be used.
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5.2 Future Directions
There are several valuable research topics that follow from our work:
• Duplication amount: When a flow is distributed using the BLB algorithm
of the Load Balancer, it might be duplicated up to F times. It would be
interesting to learn which values of F would give the best trade-off between
the loss of correlation information and the load balancing. These values of F
might have some important connections with the Load Manager’s duplication
amount upper bound.
• Number of maintained clusters: The clusters play a very important role in
the BLB algorithm of the Load Balancer since they characterize the received
traffic. It would be interesting to identify the lowest number of clusters which
can still characterize the traffic well enough to support the detection of the
major intrusions. Because a high number of clusters causes a high system
overhead, the smaller the number of clusters, the better the performance of
the Load Balancer.
• Detection-state preservation: As we discussed in Section 4.4.1, the primary
expense of moving flows is the loss of some detection states. With the emerg-
ing virtual machine (VM) technology, it is possible to live-migrate a VM from
one physical machine to another. It would be interesting to see how the VM
technology can help to move flows from an overloaded NIDPS to another
NIDPS while preserving the detection states.
• Complex correlations: With the space and time advantage of Bloom filters,
the Load Manager is capable of supporting potentially complex correlations,
as long as they are compressible into Bloom filters. It would be interesting





This section provides details of the Heuristic Flow Selection algorithm, which is
discussed in Section 4.4.5. This algorithm is presented in Algorithm 6. The inputs
of this algorithm are the specified benefit B and the set of active flows F of the
overloaded NIDPS. The flows are assumed to be ordered according to decreasing





≥ · · · ≥ cn
bn
.
In this algorithm, we first initialize 3 variables B∗, C, and im (Line 1–7): B
∗ is the
capacity of the knapsack, C is the current cost (or value), and im is the index of
the highest-cost flow. Next, we use the greedy algorithm proposed by Martello and
Toth [25] to find the xi’s (Line 8–20). We note that although the original algorithm
would find the yi’s, here we directly derive the values of the xi’s instead. Finally,
to avoid the worst case scenario, we compare the resulting total cost (total item
value) with the cost of the highest-cost flow (value of the highest value item) (Line
21–26). The highest-cost flow will be solely selected if it has a higher cost. Similar
to the greedy algorithm, our algorithm has the worst-case performance ratio 1
2
, i.e.,
in the worst case scenario, total value of the items of the solution of this algorithm
is 1
2
of the optimal solution’s. Also, the time complexity is O(n), plus O(n log n) to
sort the flows in advance.
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Algorithm 6 HeuristicFlowSelection(B,F )
Require: c1
b1
≥ · · · ≥ cn
bn
, bi and ci are the benefit and cost of flow fi in F .
Ensure: A set containing the selected flows
1: B∗ = 0
2: C = 0
3: im = 1
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: B∗ = B∗ + bi
6: end for
7: B∗ = B∗ −B
8: Bremain = B
∗
9: for i = 1 to n do
10: if bi > Bremain then
11: xi = 1 //select flow
12: else
13: xi = 0 //do not select flow
14: Bremain = Bremain − bi
15: C = C + ci
16: end if
17: if ci > cim and bim ≤ B∗ then
18: im = i
19: end if
20: end for
21: if cim > C then
22: for i = 1 to n do
23: xi = 1 //select flow
24: end for
25: xim = 0 //do not select flow
26: end if
27: M = ∅ //return set
28: for i = 1 to n do
29: if xi = 1 then
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